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PAYING FOR RISK: BANKERS, COMPENSATION,
AND COMPETITION
Simone M. Sepe† & Charles K. Whitehead††
Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong
way.  They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed
to supervise risk-taking employees.  The responses focus on executive pay, be-
lieving that executives will bring nonexecutives into line—using incentives
to manage risk taking—once their own pay is regulated.  What these re-
sponses overlook is the effect on nonexecutive pay of the competition for tal-
ent.  Even if executive pay is regulated, and executives act in the bank’s best
interests, they will still be trapped into providing incentives that encourage
risk taking by nonexecutives due to the negative externality that arises from
that competition.
Greater risk taking can increase short-term profits and, in turn, the
amount a nonexecutive receives, potentially at the expense of long-term bank
value.  Nonexecutives, therefore, have an incentive to incur significant risk
upfront so long as they can depart for a new employer before any losses mate-
rialize.  The result is an upward spiral in compensation—reducing an exec-
utive’s ability to set nonexecutive pay and the ability of any one bank to
adjust compensation to reflect risk taking and long-term outcomes.
New regulation must address the tension between compensation and
competition.  Regulators should take account of the effect of competition on
market-wide levels of pay, including by nonbanks that compete for talent.
The ability of nonexecutives to jump from a bank employer to another finan-
cial firm should also be limited.  In addition, banks should be required to
include a long-term equity component in nonexecutive pay, with subsequent
employers being restricted from compensating a new employee for any losses
she incurs related to her prior work.
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INTRODUCTION
Nick Leeson, a midlevel futures trader, was not yet thirty years old
in 1995 when he incurred the $1.3 billion in losses that blew up
Barings Bank.  In 1993, when Leeson’s trading profits were 10 percent
of Barings’s annual income, he earned a bonus of £130,000 on a salary
of £50,000.1  Fabrice Tourre, then a twenty-nine-year-old vice presi-
dent, was charged with fraud in Goldman Sachs’s 2007 sale of its Aba-
cus subprime collateralized debt obligations.  Tourre’s compensation
that year, well before the start of the fraud investigation, was $2 mil-
lion.2  Bruno Iksil, nicknamed the “London Whale” for the size of his
trading portfolio, was a JPMorgan proprietary trader in his late thirties
who realized losses of up to $6.2 billion in 2012.3  Iksil’s total compen-
sation was $7.32 million in 2010 and $6.76 million in 2011.4
All three—Leeson, Tourre, and Iksil—share common character-
istics: None was a bank executive.  Each had the authority (real or
apparent) to engage in significant business activities on his employer’s
behalf.  And the risks they incurred profited their employers in the
short term—eventually causing losses or lawsuits, but only after each
was paid handsomely.
1 See Mark Roodhouse, Leeson, Nick, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPO-
RATE CRIME 493 (Lawrence M. Salinger ed., 2005); see also How Leeson Broke the Bank, BBC
NEWS (June 22, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/375259.stm.
2 See Steven Davidoff Solomon & Peter J. Henning, The Importance of Fabrice Tourre,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/the-importance-
of-fabrice-tourre/; see also Shannon D. Harrington et al., JPMorgan Trader Iksil Fuels Prop-
Trading Debate with Bets, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-04-09/jpmorgan-trader-iksil-fuels-prop-trading-debate-with-bets.html.
3 See Harrington et al., supra note 2; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Sues Boss of
‘London Whale’ in Trading Loss, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/10/31/jpmorgan-sues-boss-of-london-whale/.
4 See STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE
HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES 58 (Comm. Print 2013) [hereinafter U.S. SENATE
REPORT].
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Why, then, in the wake of the financial crisis, has executive com-
pensation been a principal focus of efforts to control bank risk?5
Although bank supervisors have provided new guidance on nonexecu-
tive pay,6 the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)7 requires banks
that received government aid during the financial crisis to modify only
how senior executives and top earners are paid.8  The new “say-on-
pay” rules also give shareholders a nonbinding vote on compensation,
but again, only on executive pay.9
5 Prior to the financial crisis, the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act of
1991 required the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve
Board (Fed), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) to prescribe standards that would regulate compensation generally. See
Pub. L. No. 102-242, sec. 132, § 39(c), 105 Stat. 2236, 2268 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831p-1(c) (2012)); Standards for Safety and Soundness, 60 Fed. Reg. 35674, 35674,
35678 (July 10, 1995).  Those agencies adopted guidelines prohibiting “excessive compen-
sation”—compensation that is “unreasonable or disproportionate to the services per-
formed by an executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder”—and any
compensation that could lead to “material financial loss.”  12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. A (2013)
(OCC); pt. 208, app. D-1 (Fed); pt. 364, app. A (FDIC); pt. 570, app. A (OTS).
6 See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,395
(June 25, 2010) [hereinafter Compensation Guidance].  A summary description of the
Compensation Guidance appears in the Appendix.
7 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–5241 (2012).
TARP’s implementing rules are set out at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30 (2013).
8 See 12 U.S.C. § 5221.
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (2013).  Academics have also
focused primarily on executive pay. See, e.g., PATRICK BOLTON ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF
N.Y., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RISK TAKING 24–32 (2010), available at http://www
.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr456.pdf (studying the connection between risk
taking and executive compensation in financial institutions and providing an empirical
analysis of market perceptions of debt-like compensation); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger
Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010) (identifying incentives for
risk taking embedded in executive compensation); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Re-
forming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG.
359, 361–63 (2009) (suggesting an executive incentive compensation plan consisting only
of restricted stock and restricted stock options in order to manage the firm in the long-
term interests of shareholders); Robert DeYoung et al., Executive Compensation and Business
Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 165 (2013) (find-
ing evidence that bank CEO incentives encouraged risk taking); Simone M. Sepe, Making
Sense of Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 196–207 (2011) (noting that fixed
compensation schemes may be desirable to efficiently control the risk-taking incentives of
executives); David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 609 (2011) (considering the evolution in executive equity pay
practices and examining the limitations on efficient compensation contracting); Ing-Haw
Cheng et al., Yesterday’s Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms 2–5 (European Cor-
porate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 285, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1502762 (presenting evidence linking top-management compensation and risk at
financial firms during 1992–2008); Marc Chesney et al., Managerial Incentives to Take Asset
Risk 4–5 (Swiss Fin. Inst., Working Paper No. 10–18, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1595343 (finding that CEO incentives promoted risk taking by banks prior to the
financial crisis).  Some have argued that excessive compensation—at least with respect to
CEOs and other senior executives—was not a likely cause of bank risk prior to the financial
crisis. See Ru¨diger Fahlenbrach & Rene´ M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99
J. FIN. ECON. 11, 12–13 (2011); see also Francesco Vallascas & Jens Hagendorff, CEO Bonus
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The focus on executive pay addresses the wrong problem in the
wrong way.  It presumes that the problem with excessive bank risk
prior to the 2007 financial crisis was internal—that bank CEOs failed
to supervise employees who pursued risky strategies.  Fixing executive
pay has been the response, with the expectation that executives will
bring nonexecutives10 into line—using incentives to manage risk tak-
ing—once executive pay is regulated.11  Yet, as this Article describes, it
was nonexecutive incentives that significantly affected bank risk taking
prior to the 2007 financial crisis; and the structure, as well as the level,
of those incentives was determined largely by the market’s demand for
talent, independent of executive pay.12  In particular, what the current
focus misses is the effect on compensation of the competition among
financial firms to hire nonexecutives.  That effect is significant.  In a
competitive market, firms are expected to adjust compensation in line
with market demand, assessing and paying employees based on their
relative ability to generate returns.  In principle, that competition
should align employee and employer incentives, allocating the best
Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe, 22 FIN. MARKETS, INSTI-
TUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 47, 47 (2013) (finding that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower a
bank’s default risk, except when the bank is financially distressed or operating within a
weak regulatory regime).
10 References in this Article to a bank’s “nonexecutives” are to employees who are not
senior, top-ranking members of the bank’s management.
11 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9, at 281 (“Compensation structures R
shape the incentives of those actually making the decisions on behalf of banks, namely
bank executives.”); John Thanassoulis, The Case for Intervening in Bankers’ Pay, 67 J. FIN. 849,
850 (2012) (“Individual bankers work under a risk control regime overseen by the CEO
and the board of directors.  These senior executives can control bank risk through their
policies on hedging, diversification, and asset allocation.  Financial regulation exists to
make sure that CEOs and boards properly exercise their duties to build structures allowing
them to manage the risks taken by their employees.”).
12 See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.  A handful of recent studies have R
begun to consider the effect of nonexecutive compensation on bank risk. See, e.g.,
Christina E. Bannier et al., Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-Taking in the Banking Industry, 17
REV. FIN. 653, 653–54 (2013) (focusing on the bonus component of nonexecutive compen-
sation); Eric D. Chason, The Uneasy Case for Deferring Banker Pay, 73 LA. L. REV. 923, 927,
962–74 (2013) (criticizing proposals for the use of debt-based compensation to remuner-
ate bankers); Robert J. Jackson, Stock Unloading and Banker Incentives, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
951, 953, 956–60 (2012) (analyzing the effect of the unloading of stock-based compensa-
tion attributed to nonexecutives); Thanassoulis, supra note 11, at 849 (claiming that com- R
petition for bank employees generates a negative externality by increasing compensation
and rival banks’ default risk); Viral Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives and Bank Risk-
Taking (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 13-18, 2013) [hereinafter Acharya et
al., Non-Executive Incentives], available at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~litov/NonExecIncen
tivesBankRisk.pdf (demonstrating that incentives paid to bank nonexecutives in 2003–2006
were mainly driven by market factors and were related to higher bank risk and lower bank
value during the financial crisis); Viral V. Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking
and Competition for Managerial Talent (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
18891, 2013) [hereinafter Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha], available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w18891 (developing a theoretical model to analyze the negative externality created
by bank competition for nonexecutive talent).
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employees to the most profitable firms.13  Among banks, however,
combining performance-based pay with competition—where employ-
ees can move from one employer to the next—has had perverse
results.  Greater risk taking can increase short-term14 bank profits and,
in turn, the amount a nonexecutive is paid, potentially at the expense
of long-term bank value.15  Nonexecutives, therefore, have an incen-
tive to incur significant risk upfront so long as they can depart for a
new employer before any longer-term losses (and corresponding drop
in pay) materialize.16
For the nonexecutive, taking on greater risk becomes a win-win
strategy.  On the one hand, the nonexecutive is rewarded with higher
pay due to her greater short-term performance, because employers
are unable to assess (and discount) her risk-adjusted results.17  On the
other hand, the consequences of the nonexecutive’s risk taking are
minimized, because greater performance, and the mobility that comes
with it, permit her to change jobs and sidestep losses that arise in the
future.18  In short, efforts to hire the best talent have produced a neg-
ative externality: compensation is the product of each bank’s demand
for the same employees, and because hiring is based on short-term
performance, greater risk taking is rewarded without accounting for
potential longer-term losses.  Competition results in an upward spiral
in pay and limits the banks’ ability to efficiently adjust compensation
to reflect risk taking and long-term outcomes.19  Stated differently,
13 See infra notes 42, 84 and accompanying text. R
14 We refer to “short-term” and “long-term” periods (and similar phrases) throughout
this Article.  Our purpose is only to signify successive periods over which employees per-
form or are paid, without identifying particular lengths of time.
15 See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. R
16 Although banking has evolved, see infra Part I.A, a portion of a bank’s losses may
not be realized until the long term due to its investment in illiquid assets with maturities
that are longer than a bank’s demand deposits. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure
of Banks’ Assets and Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 7 (1995).
17 See infra notes 85, 99 and accompanying text. R
18 See infra notes 53, 99, 104–05 and accompanying text. R
19 See infra notes 96–99, 104–05 and accompanying text; see also Bannier et al., supra R
note 12, at 655, 679.  As the Financial Times described it, R
Banks operate in a world where their star talent is apt to jump between
different groups, whenever a bigger pay-packet appears, with scant regard
for corporate loyalty or employment contracts.  The result is that the com-
pensation committees of many banks feel utterly trapped . . . .  [A]s [one
senior financial executive] says: “These bonuses are crazy - we all know that.
But we don’t know how to stop paying them without losing our best staff.”
Gillian Tett, What Bankers Can Learn from Chelsea Football Club, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2009),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/03988992-9e6a-11de-b0aa-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3H
kdNkFb7.  The Treasury Department, the Fed, and the FDIC also noted the effect of com-
pensation on bank risk prior to the financial crisis: “Flawed incentive compensation prac-
tices in the financial industry were one of many factors contributing to the financial crisis
that began in 2007.  Banking organizations too often rewarded employees for increasing
the organization’s revenue or short-term profit without adequate recognition of the risks
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even if executive pay is regulated, and executives act in the bank’s best
interests, they will still be trapped into providing risk-prone incentives
to nonexecutives due to the negative externality that arises from the
competition for talent.20
In this account of compensation and competition, banks face an
informational problem and a coordination problem.  The informa-
tional problem arises from a bank’s inability to assess an employee’s
risk-adjusted results unless she remains employed long enough for the
full consequences of her strategy to materialize.21  The coordination
problem arises from each bank’s efforts to hire the same nonexecu-
tives.  Each bank has a legitimate interest in luring the best perform-
ers, but in doing so, it rewards employees who may choose to enhance
short-term performance at the expense of increased risk taking and
longer-term losses.22
We argue for three regulatory changes to address these problems.
First, reflecting change in the financial markets, regulators should ex-
tend their assessment of compensation beyond individual banks to in-
clude the effect of competition on market-wide levels of pay,
including the broader range of employers who now compete with
banks for talent.23  Second, some of a bank’s nonexecutives should be
restricted from moving to other financial employers (including banks,
insurance companies, broker-dealers, and hedge funds) for a period
of time after leaving the bank, subject to defined exceptions.  A
mandatory “garden leave” period24 will increase the cost of departure,
as well as permit successor employers to better assess a prospective
hire’s performance, helping to balance against a nonexecutive’s in-
centives for short-term risk taking.25  Third, banks should be required
to include a long-term equity component in nonexecutive pay, with
the employees’ activities posed to the organization.”  Compensation Guidance, supra note
6, at 36,396; accord FIN. STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION PRAC- R
TICES 1 (2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904b
.pdf (describing consistent principles of the Financial Stability Forum, which was renamed
the Financial Stability Board in April 2009) [hereinafter FSF PRINCIPLES].
20 See infra note 169 and accompanying text. R
21 See infra notes 85–86, 99, 153 and accompanying text. R
22 See infra notes 87–88, 100, 154 and accompanying text. R
23 See infra Part III.A.
24 “Garden leave” is a U.K.-originated employment practice that has become increas-
ingly common in the United States, often as a substitute for a contractual covenant not to
compete.  Under a garden leave provision, an employee is required to give her employer
advance notice of her intention to depart and must serve out a period of time at home (or
“in the garden”) before starting a new job.  The employee receives all salary and benefits
(but not bonus) during the period. See Timothy J. Perri, Garden Leave vs. Covenants Not to
Compete, 6 REV. L. & ECON. 167, 167–68 (2010); Jeffrey S. Klein & Nichols J. Pappas, ‘Garden
Leave’ Clauses in Lieu of Non-Competes, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 5, 2009, at 3.
25 See infra Part III.B.
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subsequent employers being restricted from compensating a new em-
ployee for any losses she incurs related to her prior work.26
To be clear, our goal is not to try to set an optimal, one-size-fits-all
pay structure.  Banks are diverse, suggesting that compensation—to
be effective in helping manage risk—must take account of the circum-
stances of each individual firm.27  Rather, we argue, an approach to
regulating pay that focuses on individual banks without also taking
account of the market-wide competition for talent will fail to address
the risk-taking incentives that arose prior to the financial crisis.  That
competition will continue to distort individual efforts to craft compen-
sation that aims to manage risk.28
We lay out our basic claim in Part I—namely, that nonexecutive
pay in the financial markets is largely set by the competitive demand
for talent, leading to an overall increase in pay and distortion in risk
incentives for nonexecutives.  Part II provides empirical support for
our claim, setting out findings based on a model developed for a re-
cent empirical study of bank nonexecutive compensation coauthored
by one of us.29  Those findings deliver two major results.  First, they
show that bank nonexecutive pay before the financial crisis
(2003–2006) was tied largely to short-term bank performance, con-
tributing to the increased bank risk and reduced bank value that oc-
curred during the financial crisis (2007–2009).  Second, they
demonstrate the impact of market factors on nonexecutive incentives
and, in turn, on bank risk and bank value.  Finally, in Part III, we
propose new regulation to address competition’s effects on compensa-
tion and the problems this Article identifies.  We also discuss the value
of a mandatory compensation cap that is more robust than the mea-
sure proposed in the European Union.30
I
COMPENSATION AND COMPETITION
Competition is the key to efficiency in the neoclassical economic
model.31  Assuming perfect information, competition ensures that in-
dividuals and firms are led, almost as if by an invisible hand,32 to
26 See infra Part III.C.
27 See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,397. R
28 See infra notes 99–100, 104–05 and accompanying text. R
29 See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12. R
30 See infra notes 181–88 and accompanying text. R
31 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? 45 (1994).
32 In his seminal work, Adam Smith characterized the virtues of a free-market econ-
omy where individuals selfishly interact among themselves but together advance the public
interest as if led by an invisible hand. See ADAM SMITH, 2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 273 (1801).
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allocate resources optimally.33  Because information is complete, no
employee has an interest in misbehaving—employers can observe
whether the employee benefits the firm, making it irrational for her to
act opportunistically.34  Compensation is less important because com-
petition and perfect information lead to an optimal outcome without
the need for incentives.35
Incentives matter, however, once we begin to relax the model’s
idealized assumptions.36  That explains why incentive theory—based
on the standard principal-agent model of the firm37—has gained so
much influence in modern economics.38  A starting point of that
theory is the recognition that informational asymmetries arise when
labor is divided between principals (employers) and agents (employ-
ees).  The agent develops private information, which can be of two
types: she may have hidden knowledge of her own characteristics or
value, a problem known as “adverse selection”;39 or she may take hid-
den actions, a problem known as “moral hazard.”40  A primary
33 The analytical characterization of Smith’s “invisible hand” is represented by the
First Welfare Theorem (also known as the Arrow-Debreu model), which states that a com-
petitive equilibrium (the equilibrium that arises when consumers maximize their utility
and firms maximize their profits) is, under certain assumptions, Pareto optimal. See
Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22
ECONOMETRICA 265, 265–66 (1954); see also ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 549–50 (1995) (discussing the First Welfare Theorem in the context of general
equilibrium theory).
34 See Bengt Holmstro¨m, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74
(1979).
35 See STIGLITZ, supra note 31, at 66 (“Incentives . . . play no role in the standard R
neoclassical theory.”).
36 See id. at 66–68.  Bruce Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz demonstrated that the results
of the Arrow-Debreu model are no longer valid when the idealized assumptions of perfect
information are dropped. See Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Econ-
omies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q.J. ECON. 229, 231–38 (1986).
37 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976).
38 See generally JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCEN-
TIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 11–15 (2002) (providing a systematic treatment of in-
centive theory).
39 George Akerlof received the Nobel Prize in Economics for his classic account of
adverse selection in the products market.  Under conditions of uncertainty, a seller does
not know how much a buyer is willing to pay for a good, in other words, whether the
buyer’s type is “good” or “bad.” See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970).  Akerlof shows that,
when the number of bad buyers is relatively high, sellers may prefer to stop exchanging
goods, leading to a market breakdown.  Other examples of adverse selection include (i)
when a firm hires a worker and does not know the worker’s ability, see Michael Spence, Job
Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 356 (1973), and (ii) when an insurance company in-
sures a car, and the driver has private information about her risk propensity, see Michael
Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay in the
Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 630–32 (1976).
40 See LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 38, at 145 (“By the mere fact of delegation, R
the principal often loses any ability to control those actions [of the agent] that are no
longer observable . . . .”).  Moral hazard involves an agent’s suboptimal “effort choices” and
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concern is that the employee may choose to exploit this informational
asymmetry to her own advantage, potentially at the employer’s ex-
pense.41  Incentive theory relies on compensation to assist in aligning
the agent’s and the principal’s interests.42  Competition is also impor-
tant but not as central, providing a means to benchmark performance
and adjust compensation.43
Incentive theory is often framed within a “bilateral agency” rela-
tionship, which assumes that principals do not compete with other
principals, and agents do not compete with other agents.44  That is the
model underlying the regulation of executive pay—focusing on the
relationship between employers and employees, without taking ac-
count of the competition among employers.45  But what happens
when principals begin to compete?  Relationships in a competitive
world are explored within a “common agency” model, which consid-
ers what can occur when principals with conflicting interests compete
for the services of a common agent (the employee).46  Competition
induces each employer to offer the employee a compensation con-
tract that makes the other contracts less appealing.47  The employee
“risk choices.” See Martin F. Hellwig, A Reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling Model of Outside
Finance, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 495, 495 (2009) (referring to this problem as “two-
dimensional moral hazard”).  Effort choices involve the choice by the agent of a given level
of effort that affects her performance. See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CON-
TRACT THEORY 129 (2005).  A moral hazard arises because effort is costly to the agent, who
may have incentives to act suboptimally.  Risk choices involve moral hazard when an agent
chooses a given level of risk on behalf of the principal but where she may have incentives to
engage in excessive or insufficient risk taking. See Bruno Biais & Catherine Casamatta,
Optimal Leverage and Aggregate Investment, 54 J. FIN. 1291, 1293 (1999).
41 See LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 38, at 11–12.  Screening and monitoring can R
reduce the amount of private information.  Through screening, the principal can cause
the agent to reveal private information by providing her with a menu of choices; which
choice the agent selects reveals private information about the agent. See Rothschild &
Stiglitz, supra note 39, at 639, 643.  Through monitoring, the principal can collect and R
process information about the agent and her behavior. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 334–35 (2006).
42 Under incentive theory, compensation contracts essentially are designed to elicit
private information by paying the agent an amount equal to what she would have received
if she had behaved opportunistically.  The contract must also induce the agent to volunta-
rily enter into the contractual relationship by rewarding her an amount at least equal to
the value to her of not entering into the contract.  For an analytical description, see LAF-
FONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 38, at 36–37. R
43 See STIGLITZ, supra note 31, at 111–12. R
44 See LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 38, at 29–30. R
45 See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text. R
46 The seminal work on common agency is B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D.
Whinston, Common Agency, 54 ECONOMETRICA 923 (1986).  For a survey of common agency
studies, see David Martimort, Multi-Contracting Mechanism Design, in 1 ADVANCES IN ECONOM-
ICS AND ECONOMETRICS 57 (Richard Blundell et al. eds., 2006) (highlighting the crucial
importance of coordination among principals).  For a discussion of common agency in the
context of corporations, see Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts,
36 J. CORP. L. 113, 128–33 (2010).
47 See Bernheim & Whinston, supra note 46, at 927–30. R
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can use that competition to her advantage by negotiating for greater
pay through the threat of accepting a competitor’s offer.48  Anticipat-
ing her competitors’ interest, the first employer is induced to enhance
the compensation contract she originally offers.49  The result is an
inefficient escalation in employee pay50 that undercuts the ability of
any one employer to design an efficient compensation contract.51
The common agency model informs our analysis of bank non-
executive compensation.  As we describe below, in a competitive mar-
ket, each bank naturally pursues the same employees based on their
short-term performance.52  Consistent with the common agency
model, greater competition results in an upward spiral in pay and lim-
its the banks’ ability to efficiently adjust compensation to reflect risk
taking and long-term outcomes.  Riskier strategies and heightened
performance improve an employee’s compensation and, by making
her more attractive to competitors, permit her to jump to a new job
and sidestep the losses that later result.53  In aggregate, this has per-
mitted nonexecutives to take on excessive risk in the short term with-
out facing the longer-term consequences of their risk taking.54
Next, in subpart A, we describe the industry setting within which
bank nonexecutive compensation has evolved.  Changes in the finan-
cial markets caused market participants increasingly to compete for
the same business with the same customers.  That change fueled an
increase in the competition for talent, with compensation levels esca-
lating in line with market demand.  Subpart B then describes how
competition and performance-based compensation distorted the in-
centives for risk taking.  By assuming more risk, a bank employee
could prompt a short-term rise in performance and pay—and, by
switching jobs, she could avoid the later consequences of the risks she
assumed.  The result was a run-up in bank risk (2003–2006)55 that
contributed to the reduction in bank value during the financial crisis
(2007–2009).56
48 For example, when principals compete on the basis of price, the agent can exploit
that competition and extract additional rents. See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 33, at R
388–89 (applying a model of price competition between firms in an oligopolistic market).
49 See Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Con-
tracts, 58 ECONOMETRICA 1279, 1279–82, 1307–08 (1990).
50 See STIGLITZ, supra note 31, at 114 (observing that in some contexts, including the R
managerial labor market, “competition does not serve social goals: Resources get dissi-
pated in the competition for rents”).
51 See Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with
Externalities, 71 ECONOMETRICA 757, 758–59 (2003).
52 See infra notes 79–83, 98–99, 104 and accompanying text. R
53 See infra notes 99, 104–05, 173 and accompanying text. R
54 See infra notes 87–88, 105 and accompanying text. R
55 See infra Part II.B.
56 See infra Part II.C.
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A. Competition in the Financial Markets
The backdrop to our analysis of bank nonexecutive pay is the
shift in the financial markets that occurred over the last fifty years—
moving from a divided marketplace to one that increasingly involves
competition between banks and nonbanks.  The U.S. financial mar-
kets were divided by regulation into separate categories following the
Great Depression, largely in response to perceived abuses leading up
to the economic collapse of the late 1920s.57  The Glass-Steagall Act,58
for example, created a regulatory divide between commercial and in-
vestment banking.59  Twenty years later, the Bank Holding Company
Act60 extended that separation by walling off banks from the under-
writing of insurance products.61  Those regulations began to evolve in
the 1950s largely in response to change in the financial markets.62
57 Senator Carter Glass noted that speculation, fueled with funds from commercial
banks, “chang[ed] the whole character of the banking problem.” CARTER GLASS, OPERA-
TION OF THE NAT’L & FED. RESERVE BANKING SYSTEMS, COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, S.
REP. NO. 72-584, at 8 (1932).  As a result of the separation, financial regulation has been
premised on decades-old business models—from the 1930s for banks, securities firms, and
thrifts, and from the 1940s for investment advisors and mutual funds. See Roberta S.
Karmel, The Challenge to Financial Regulators Posed by Social Security Privatization, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 1043, 1049–50, 1056–57 (1998) (describing statutory distinctions that control regula-
tory oversight). Compare Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Capital Adequacy Regulation: In
Search of a Rationale 3 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 03-07, 2002), available at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/03/0307.pdf (questioning the theoretical ratio-
nale for the division), with John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 717–19 (2009) (suggesting that regulation
tied to business models is durable).  For a description of financial intermediary categories,
see Robert Charles Clark, The Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J.
1603, 1605–08 & nn.1–21 (1975) (describing the role and long-term growth of financial
intermediaries); Gary Gorton, Bank Regulation When ‘Banks’ and ‘Banking’ Are Not the Same,
10 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 106, 106–07 (1994) (noting recent global trends of nonbanks
engaging in banking activities); and Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Finan-
cial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 322–31 (1999) (conceptual-
izing financial arrangements on a continuum).
58 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  The barrier between banking and investment banking was
largely repealed by the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. See Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (repealing
§§ 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act and outlining authorized and proscribed activities of
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors).
59 See Banking Act § 16, 48 Stat. at 184–85 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012));
§ 20, 48 Stat. at 188–89 (repealed 1999); § 21, 48 Stat. at 189 (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 378(a) (2012)); § 32, 48 Stat. at 194 (repealed 1999); see also James R. Smoot, Bank Oper-
ating Subsidiaries: Free at Last or More of Same?, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 651, 655–56 (1997).
60 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (current version at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841–1844, 1846–1850 (2012)).
61 See Alan E. Sorcher & Satish M. Kini, Does the Term “Bank Broker-Dealer” Still Have
Meaning?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 227, 231 (2002) (noting that the Bank Holding Company
Act strengthened the Glass-Steagall Act’s restrictions).
62 See Franklin Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, The Theory of Financial Intermediation,
21 J. BANKING & FIN. 1461, 1464–74 (1998) (summarizing the significant “increase in the
breadth and depth of financial markets”); Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and
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That change accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s63 with increased com-
petition across entities and categories,64 as well as a shift in capital
raising from traditional intermediation to lower-cost alternatives, in
many cases in the capital markets.65  For banks, new regulatory capital
requirements made it more costly to continue the lending business as
they had before, causing them to explore new sources of revenue.66
Banks also experienced a decline in market share—often losing
ground to less-regulated competitors.67  Regulators began to loosen
their interpretation of permissible activities under the Glass-Steagall
the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 672, 677–80 (1987) (describing the effect on banks of developments in technology
and lending practices); Sorcher & Kini, supra note 61, at 232–33 (stating that banks’ ability R
to earn “a good and relatively risk-free living off the spread between [relatively cheap]
deposits and [low-risk, marketable] assets . . . began to change gradually commencing in
the 1950s”); Richard J. Herring & Anthony M. Santomero, What Is Optimal Financial Regula-
tion? 29–35 (Wharton Fin. Institutions Ctr., Working Paper No. 00-34, 1999), available at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/00/0034.pdf (arguing that banks became “less
special” during this time period).
63 See KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW COM-
PETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 195–217 (1st ed. 1984) (attributing this acceleration to the
quickening of “technological, organizational, and financial innovation”); see also ROBERT E.
LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 33–59 (1987) (noting the importance of changes at the
state level); Allen N. Berger et al., The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a
Long, Strange Trip It’s Been, 26 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 55, 127 (1995) (sum-
marizing changes from 1979 onward).
64 See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 63, at 2–17; see also LOWELL L. BRYAN, BREAKING UP R
THE BANK: RETHINKING AN INDUSTRY UNDER SIEGE 22–28 (1988) (focusing on banks and
thrifts); Franklin Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, What Do Financial Intermediaries Do?, 25 J.
BANKING & FIN. 271, 274–82 (2001) (showing how competition evolved through the
1990s); Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 1183, 1184–86 (1990) (discussing the relationship between competition, risk
taking, and bank and thrift failures); Sorcher & Kini, supra note 61, at 232–34 (surveying R
the development of this competition).
65 See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership,
Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 244–47 (2008); see also
Berger et al., supra note 63, at 68–70 (predicting changes in bank lending patterns); R
Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN. & QUAN-
TITATIVE ANALYSIS 459, 459–60 (1986) (suggesting innovations were primarily driven by
regulation and tax structures); Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE
ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 307, 310–12 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003) (noting
the ubiquity of innovations over time and the difficulty classifying them).
66 See Smoot, supra note 59, at 654–60 (noting increase in securitization and insur- R
ance revenue); Kevin J. Stiroh, Diversification in Banking: Is Noninterest Income the Answer?, 36
J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 853, 853–55 (2004) (discussing increase in noninterest
income).
67 See Allen & Santomero, supra note 62, at 1466–74 (summarizing the rising signifi- R
cance of intermediaries in the financial markets); Matthew Richardson et al., Large Banks
and the Volcker Rule, in REGULATING WALL ST.; THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITEC-
TURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 181, 187–88 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011) (describing how
credit institutions lost substantial market share to investment banks); Herring &
Santomero, supra note 62, at 27–30 (noting that banks have become “less special” as prov- R
iders of credit).
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Act and the Bank Holding Company Act in order to permit banks to
offer new products and services.68
Banks and nonbanks increasingly began to compete, with new
market participants in some cases replicating the functions of tradi-
tional intermediaries.  A classic example was the rise of money market
funds (MMFs) and finance companies that together began to offer
products and services similar to what banks offered, but at competitive
prices, drawing substantial numbers of depositors and borrowers from
the banking industry.69  MMFs are required by the federal securities
laws to invest in short-term, liquid, high-quality debt instruments, such
as Treasury bills and commercial paper.70  They offer investors the
convenience of a bank account, including checking services, toll-free
telephone numbers, recordkeeping, and wire transfers, but with nomi-
nally higher returns than bank deposits.71  Finance companies, in
turn, lend to business and retail borrowers, relying on MMFs for fund-
ing through the sale to them of short-term commercial paper.72  To-
gether, MMFs and finance companies began to mirror the traditional
balance between depositors and borrowers—but now between MMFs
and finance companies—resulting in a substantial shift in liquid
household assets from the banking sector to the capital markets.73
Banks also began to change their business, partly to minimize reg-
ulatory costs.  For example, during the twenty years leading up to the
2007 financial crisis, the asset-backed securities market was fueled by
the drive toward lower-cost financing.  Banks reportedly were forced
to move subprime assets off their balance sheets in light of the higher
costs they incurred compared to securities firms.74  As a result, assets
traditionally held by banks moved to a “shadow” banking system com-
prised of structured investment vehicles and other financing conduits
set up to minimize the effects of regulatory capital requirements.75  In
68 See Thomas G. Fischer et al., The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV. 467, 474–502 (1984); Sorcher & Kini, supra note 61, at R
233–34 (describing the abandonment of historically narrow and “cautious interpretations”
of the Glass-Steagall Act).
69 See FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS, THE NEW FINANCE: REGULATION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
16–19 (1996).
70 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2013); see also MONEY MKT. WORKING GRP., INVEST. CO.
INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP 31–39 (2009), available at http://
www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf (describing regulation of MMFs).
71 See EDWARDS, supra note 69, at 16–17. R
72 See JANE W. D’ARISTA & TOM SCHLESINGER, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE PARALLEL BANK-
ING SYSTEM 3–4, 7–14 (1993), available at http://s1.epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefingpa
pers/1993_bp_parallel.pdf.
73 See EDWARDS, supra note 69, at 73–74; D’ARISTA & SCHLESINGER, supra note 72, at R
3–4, 7–14.
74 See Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction—Structured Finance and Credit Market Re-
form in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53, 57–60 (2009).
75 See Floyd Norris, No Way to Make a Loan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at C1; Timothy F.
Geithner, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at The
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addition, banks entered new business lines.  Since the 1980s, for ex-
ample, banks began trading commodity derivatives—financial con-
tracts whose values are linked to changes in the price of a referenced
commodity, such as oil or iron ore.76  More recently, banks began to
buy and sell the physical commodities underlying those derivatives—
in some cases, requiring them to take ownership and delivery of the
commodity itself—as an activity that was “complementary” to their
derivatives business.77
The financial markets continue to converge as banks and non-
banks compete across traditional business lines.78  Greater homogene-
ity in products and services has also sharpened the competition for
the same employees, who increasingly overlap in skills and qualities.79
The upshot, as described next, has been growth in the demand for
talent as banks and nonbanks compete to hire the same people—and,
like change in the financial industry generally, a shift in how banks
hire and compensate nonexecutives.
B. Competition’s Effects on Compensation and Risk Taking
Bankers were paid a largely fixed salary before the financial mar-
kets began to converge.  Performance incentives were less important,
Economic Club of New York, New York City, Reducing Systemic Risk in a Dynamic Finan-
cial System (June 9, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/
2008/tfg080609.html; see also Unterman, supra note 74, at 59–60.  As Representative Barney R
Frank recalled, former Citigroup chairman and CEO, Chuck Prince, told him that off-
balance sheet financing was necessary because on-balance sheet financing “would have put
Citigroup at a disadvantage with Wall Street investment banks that were more loosely regu-
lated and were allowed to take far greater risks.”  Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, What
Created This Monster?  Yes, the Markets Can Bite Back, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at BU1.
76 See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodi-
ties, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 292–94 (2013).
77 In 2003, for example, following its acquisition of Salomon Brothers, Citigroup be-
came the first bank holding company to obtain bank regulatory approval of its commodity-
trading unit’s buying and selling of physical commodities.  That approval included trading
in commodities on the spot market, as well as taking and making physical delivery of com-
modities to settle commodity derivatives. See Dietrich Domanski & Alexandra Heath, Fi-
nancial Investors and Commodity Markets, 2007 BIS Q. REV. 53, 65–66 (describing the rise of
financial investors in the commodities market); see also Omarova, supra note 76, at 297–307 R
(describing the growth of bank trading in commodities).
78 See Gorton, supra note 57, at 116–18; Jonathan R. Macey, Derivative Instruments: Les- R
sons for the Regulatory State, 21 J. CORP. L. 69, 78 (1995); Robert C. Merton, Operation and
Regulation in Financial Intermediation: A Functional Perspective, in OPERATION AND REGULATION
OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 17, 33–41 (Peter Englund ed., 1993).  Some new regulation limits
competition.  For example, section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, commonly known as the Volcker Rule, limits financial market com-
petition (with some exceptions) by, among other things, prohibiting a “banking entity”
from “engag[ing] in proprietary trading” or “acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, part-
nership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or a private equity
fund.”  12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
79 See Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, supra note 12, at 4 (describing the skills of financial R
sector employees as being “highly fungible”).
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because bankers were not expected to seek substantial returns.80  That
changed—with a rise in performance-based pay—as competition be-
tween banks and nonbanks grew.81  How compensation was set shifted
from being an internal process to increasingly being determined by
what others in the marketplace would pay—including investment
banks and, more recently, hedge funds.82  Individual banks adjusted
what they paid in order to remain competitive.83
Tying compensation to financial performance was designed to
align employees’ and employers’ interests.84  The change in pay struc-
ture, however, created two problems.  First, it distorted an employee’s
80 See Kevin J. Murphy, Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: A Case Study
in Unintended Consequences 3–5 (Univ. of S. Cal. Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 13–8,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235395 (noting that performance incentives
were less important “for decades, dating back to the days when investment banks were
privately held partnerships”).
81 See id. at 4 (stating that, as banks moved into investment banking, they “faced a
growing tension between . . . traditional commercial bankers — paid high salaries with
relatively little performance-based pay — and the professionals in its investment-banking
divisions[, and u]ltimately, commercial banks began offering investment-banking-type re-
muneration for top performers throughout the organization”).  The result was a substan-
tial increase in financial sector compensation.  From 1980 onwards, the financial sector
became a high-skill and high-wage industry (compared to other sectors of the U.S. econ-
omy), in line with changes in regulation that permitted greater competition across the
financial markets. See Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the
U.S. Finance Industry: 1909–2006, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1551, 1552 (2012).
82 See Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, A Theory of Wage Dynamics, 49 REV. ECON.
STUD. 315, 316 (1982) (noting that compensation is influenced by what competing employ-
ers are willing to pay).  When an agent has an outside option—and can accept a job offer
from a competitor if bargaining with her employer fails—the principal must design the
agent’s contract to match the agent’s other opportunities in order to induce her to accept
the contract. See Jonathan Levin, Relational Incentive Contracts, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 835, 836
(2003).  Although banks are subject to the Compensation Guidance, other prospective em-
ployers—including securities firms and hedge funds—are not. See Compensation Gui-
dance, supra note 6, at 36,396. R
83 As the Treasury Department, the Fed, and the FDIC noted when summarizing com-
ments on the proposed Compensation Guidance:
Several commenters . . . expressed concern that the proposed guidance, if
implemented, could impede the ability of banking organizations to attract
or retain qualified staff and compete with other financial services providers.
In light of these concerns, some commenters suggested that the guidance
expressly allow banking organizations to enter into such compensation ar-
rangements as they deem necessary for recruitment or retention purposes.
A number of commenters also encouraged the Federal Reserve to work
with other domestic and foreign supervisors and authorities to promote
consistent standards for incentive compensation practices at financial insti-
tutions and a level competitive playing field for financial service providers.
Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,398.
84 Nonexecutive pay shares goals similar to those identified for executive compensa-
tion, namely (i) rewarding success, (ii) providing incentives, (iii) retaining and attracting
talent, and (iv) aligning shareholder and employee interests. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on
Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 323, 329 (2009) (listing the goals of executive compensation); see also supra note 42 R
and accompanying text (claiming that compensation assists in aligning principal and agent
interests).
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risk incentives.  Banks are unable to assess an employee’s risk-adjusted
results unless she remains at the bank long enough for the conse-
quences of her strategy to materialize.85  A bank employee, therefore,
can anticipate being rewarded in the short term for higher returns,
regardless of whether they resulted from her talent (her ability to out-
perform the market) or excessive risk taking.  She has a particular in-
terest in concealing her high-risk strategy from others—making it
appear as if she outperformed her peers based on talent alone.86  The
result is an overall increase in risk taking, which can boost short-term
performance and pay but potentially at the expense of long-term bank
value,87 also referred to as a “tail-risk strategy.”88
85 See Bannier et al., supra note 12, at 655–56; Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, supra note R
12, at 3–4. R
86 An employee who seeks to conceal a high-risk strategy may pursue complicated
projects that are difficult for an employer to monitor or jump to a new job before the risks
are realized so that management of the projects moves to someone else. See Igor Makarov
& Guillaume Plantin, Rewarding Trading Skills Without Inducing Gambling 1–3 (Apr.
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571545 (describ-
ing the incentive of fund managers to incur risk without detection in order to manipulate
reputations and attract more funds).  Even managers who can differentiate among poten-
tial hires may lack the incentive to do so out of concern that this may delay the hiring
process and risk losing the best performers to competitors.  See Roy C. Smith, Greed is Good,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7–8, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123396915233059229
.html#CX (“You had to pay everyone well . . . because there was always someone trying to
poach your best trained people, whom you didn’t want to lose even if they were not super-
stars.”).  Risk managers also may have little incentive to control risk to the extent that
minimizing risk is not valued by the bank (or if the value is difficult to measure) and doing
so lowers the bank’s short-term performance. See Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulat-
ing Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 216–18 (2009).  Consequently, the failure
to take account of the employees’ interest in concealing high-risk strategies—by using reve-
nues, rather than risk-adjusted profits, to set compensation—was found by senior financial
regulators after the financial crisis to be one critical area of risk management that requires
improvement. See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GRP., RISK MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL
BANKING CRISIS OF 2008, at 24–25 (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2009/report102109.pdf (“Individual performance measurement schemes have often not
reflected true economic profits, adjusted for known costs and uncertainty.”); see also MA-
THIAS DEWATRIPONT & JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS 120 (1994)
(suggesting that the limited verifiability of an agent’s actions makes performance-based
compensation an insufficient discipline).
87 See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 137–39 (2010) [hereinafter RAJAN, FAULT LINES] (explaining how bank-
ers’ search for “alpha” (excess returns) resulted in the undertaking of excessive risk); see
also Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?, in THE GREEN-
SPAN ERA: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 313, 315–17 (2005) [hereinafter Rajan, Financial Devel-
opment] (same); Krishnan Sharma, Financial Sector Compensation and Excess Risk-Taking—A
Consideration of the Issues and Policy Lessons 2 (U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Social Affairs, Working
Paper No. 115, 2012), available at http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2012/wp115_2012
.pdf (observing that asymmetries in the “term, magnitude and probability of gains and
losses” combined to encourage the undertaking of tail risk in the banking sector).
88 Tail risk is less likely to occur than other risk, although its magnitude may be signif-
icant. See RAJAN, FAULT LINES, supra note 87, at 137; see also Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, R
supra note 12, at 3 (observing that it may be easier for financial sector employees to under- R
take tail-risk strategies due to potential long-run losses).
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Consider the following example.  During 2005–2007, JPMorgan’s
bankers underwrote residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
totaling $10.28 billion.89  Investors relied on cash flows from pools of
residential mortgages for the payment of principal and interest on the
RMBS, although important loan-level data were often difficult to ob-
tain90 or were unreliable.91  JPMorgan purchased those mortgages
from the firms that originated them.  From January 2006 to Septem-
ber 2007, its bankers learned that a number of the loans were substan-
dard—meaning that the mortgages failed to comply with the
originator’s own underwriting guidelines or have sufficient compen-
sating factors to justify including them in an RMBS pool.92  Excluding
them would have improved the credit quality of the RMBS, but too
many exclusions would have caused the originators to do business
elsewhere—potentially causing a drop in JPMorgan’s revenues.93  Be-
cause the bankers’ performance was measured by profitability, they
had an incentive to include lower-quality loans in the mortgage pools
(in many instances, without JPMorgan’s executives or customers being
able to differentiate among them).  As a result, rather than exclude
the loans, the bankers directed that a number of them be waived into
the pools.94  Based on one report, 27 percent of the loans JPMorgan
purchased during the period were substandard, although the bankers
accepted roughly 50 percent of them.95
Second, greater competition for talent lowered the natural con-
straint on risk taking created by long-term employment, increasing
the possibility of employee moral hazard.96  An employee’s outside job
options are limited in a heterogeneous industry.  Job skills tend to be
specific to a particular employer, resulting in longer-term employ-
89 This example is drawn from the Justice Department’s statement of facts that was
publicly released in connection with its $13 billion settlement with JPMorgan.  See U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JP MORGAN SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, ANNEX 1: STATEMENT OF
FACTS 1–2 & n.2 (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/94320131
119151031990622.pdf [hereinafter STATEMENT OF FACTS].
90 See COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A
PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM 146–48 (2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/
pdfs/TGFC-CCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf (survey of institutional investors indicating that
one-third of the data fields that most surveyed investors thought  “essential” typically was
not disclosed).
91 See, e.g., Christopher Papagianis, Housing Market in Crisis, E21 COMMENTARY SERIES
(Nov. 19, 2010), available at http://economics21.org/commentary/housing-market-crisis
(noting that the data accompanying RMBS is unreliable).
92 See STATEMENT OF FACTS, supra note 89, at 4. R
93 See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FI-
NAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 166 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
94 See STATEMENT OF FACTS, supra note 89, at 4–5. R
95 See id. at 5.
96 See Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, supra note 12, at 2–3. R
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ment that permits the employer to better assess an employee and,
based on outcome, adjust her compensation and responsibilities.97  A
lack of mobility and the potential for negative long-term results, with a
resulting drop in pay, are likely to weigh against a high-risk strategy.
That constraint weakens as the industry becomes more homogeneous
(as occurred with the financial industry98) and where, in a fluid labor
market, the employee can jump to a competitor before any long-term
losses materialize.  Having performed well in the short term, the em-
ployee can move to a new employer—seeking compensation based on
her performance, but again without her employer being able to assess
whether that performance was due to talent or a tail-risk strategy.99
The result is a negative externality—each bank naturally competes for
the same employees based on how well they do in the short term,
making it difficult for any one employer to unilaterally implement pay
incentives that adjust for risk taking and long-term outcomes.100
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship among competition, compen-
sation (employee payoff), and bank performance (bank performance).
The lower graph relates to short-term performance and the upper
graph relates to long-term performance.101
97 See Robert Parrino, CEO Turnover and Outside Succession: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, 46
J. FIN. ECON. 165, 179 (1997) (“[E]vidence suggests that industry-specific human capital is
highly valued in most industries . . . .”).
98 See supra Part I.A.
99 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. R
100 See Thanassoulis, supra note 11, at 849–50; Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, supra note R
12, at 2–3; Roland Be´nabou & Jean Tirole, Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and R
Multitasking 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 18,936, 2013), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18936 (observing that outside job options may limit an em-
ployer’s ability to manage its employees).  The competition for managerial talent may also
produce a similar negative externality by incentivizing firms to choose to underinvest in
corporate governance (providing higher levels of compensation and lower levels of disci-
pline for managers) in order to remain competitive as employers. See Viral V. Acharya &
Paolo F. Volpin, Corporate Governance Externalities, 14 REV. FIN. 1, 2–3 (2010) (developing a
theoretical model to illustrate the production of negative governance externalities by com-
petition); David L. Dicks, Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regula-
tion, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1971, 1971–72 (2012) (same).  For empirical support, see generally
Viral Acharya et al., Competition for Managers, Corporate Governance and Incentive Com-
pensation 1–2 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.london
.edu/pvolpin/compensation.pdf (providing empirical support); Ing-Haw Cheng, Corpo-
rate Governance Spillovers 1–5 (Apr. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1299652 (describing the spillover effects of poor corporate governance
on peer firms in a competitive labor market).
101 Bank performance refers to the Employee’s contribution to the bank’s revenues.
Recall that, for purposes of this Article, short-term and long-term refer to successive periods
without identifying particular lengths of time. See supra note 14. R
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FIGURE 1. COMPETITION, COMPENSATION, AND PERFORMANCE
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In our illustration, a bank Employee can undertake one of two
types of actions, either a high risk strategy or a low risk strategy.  A high
risk strategy (for example, waiving substandard loans into an RMBS
pool, as JPMorgan’s bankers did102) is likely to result in a short-term
increase in bank performance, but also yield a lower level of bank perform-
ance (or even losses) in the long-term.  A low risk strategy (for example,
excluding substandard loans from an RMBS pool103) is likely to result
in a lower level of bank performance in the short-term, but also lead to
higher long-term gains.  Due to the enhanced short-term bank performance
that results from a high risk strategy, the Employee who chooses that
approach will benefit from a higher employee payoff at point B.  Of
course, if the Employee is talented, she could also receive compensa-
tion at point B by selecting a low risk strategy.  On balance, however,
an Employee who selects a low risk strategy is more likely to contribute
102 See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. R
103 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. R
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less to bank performance in the short-term and, therefore, receive com-
pensation at point A, corresponding to medium performance.
In a noncompetitive market, an Employee who selects a low risk
strategy and remains with her first employer (subject to her original
contract) is likely in the long-term to contribute to bank performance and
receive an employee payoff corresponding to point D.  By contrast, if the
Employee opts for a high risk strategy, she is likely to realize lower long-
term compensation when the negative consequences of that strategy
materialize at point C.  Hence, in a market with limited employee mo-
bility, an Employee has an incentive to select a low risk strategy in or-
der to avoid the longer-term losses that can arise from a riskier
strategy.
In a competitive market, Employee compensation increases as
banks and other financial firms bid for high performers, shifting pay
upward in the long-term to the new contract.104  In such a market, an
Employee who pursues a low risk strategy with medium performance
may be able to increase her compensation from point D to point F.
More significantly, an Employee who pursues a high risk strategy can
more easily switch jobs due to how well she did—the high level of bank
performance—in the short-term and, in turn, avoid the long-term losses of
her riskier strategy.  In fact, since a new employer’s assessment is
based only on short-term bank performance, the Employee may be able to
negotiate a new contract—starting from an employee payoff at point E—as
if she had generated the greater returns based on superior talent
(rather than excessive risk taking).105  By adopting the same high risk
strategy at her new employer, the Employee can then increase her
compensation from point E to point G—with an overall rise in total
pay from point C (the point where her compensation would have re-
flected the long-term losses from her high risk strategy) to point G.
In addition, because a low risk strategy is more likely to un-
derperform a high risk strategy in the short-term, and because employee
payoff is determined by bank performance and not by levels of risk tak-
ing, both less-talented and talented Employees have an incentive to
pursue a high risk strategy that increases the likelihood of higher
104 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. R
105 Thus, the competition for nonexecutives creates an adverse selection problem and
a moral hazard problem.  An employer who is unable to tell whether a new hire’s perform-
ance resulted from talent or increased risk taking faces an adverse selection problem.
Moral hazard arises when a bank employee has the incentive to pursue a short-term high risk
strategy and then move to a new employer before any losses materialize. See supra notes 40, R
85–86, 99 and accompanying text. R
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compensation at points B and G.106  Doing so, however, also increases
the likelihood of greater bank losses over the long-term.107
The upshot is that growing competition for financial talent has
distorted the relationship between compensation and performance.
Increased mobility provides nonexecutives with the means to take on
greater risk without facing the consequences—first, by improving
short-term performance and, in turn, increasing their compensation
(either by current or future employers) and, second, by permitting
them to sidestep the long-term losses that result from excessive risk
taking.  As a result, nonexecutive pay in banks is no longer an inter-
nally set feature of employment.  Instead, as we set out empirically in
the next Part, it is determined by the market’s demand for talent.
II
BANK COMPENSATION AND RISK TAKING: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Part I set out our explanation of the relationship among bank
nonexecutive compensation, the competition for talent, and risk tak-
ing.  In this Part, we offer a reduced and modified version of a recent
empirical study, coauthored by one of us, that investigates nonexecu-
tive compensation in a sample of seventy-seven U.S. bank holding
companies over the period 2003–2009.108  This study delivers two ma-
jor results that support our earlier explanation.  First, it shows that
bank nonexecutive compensation before the financial crisis
(2003–2006) was tied largely to short-term bank performance, con-
tributing to the increased bank risk and reduced bank value that oc-
curred during the financial crisis (2007–2009).109  Second, it
demonstrates the impact of market factors—rather than individual
choices by top executives—on nonexecutive incentives and, in turn,
on bank risk and bank value.110  The result has been an industry-wide
106 If compensation is tied to short-term results, other employees—even if they are
normally inclined to pursue less risky strategies—are more likely to incur greater risk
rather than underperform colleagues and potentially face a drop in pay. See Sherwin
Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845, 846–47 (1981); see also supra
notes 85–86 and accompanying text. R
107 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. R
108 See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at passim.  One key differ- R
ence is that this Article uses net income rather than interest income as a measure to esti-
mate bank performance. Id. at 3–4, 9 (acknowledging the use of total interest income in
the main specifications).  Our reliance on net income is consistent with how bank bonuses
are set.  The shift in bank compensation away from largely fixed to contingent (bonus)
payments replicated the use of bonuses within the investment banking world. See Rajan,
Financial Development, supra note 87, at 315–17; Murphy, supra note 80, at 3.  That reliance R
on bonuses continues today, with base salaries constituting only a small portion of total pay
for professional employees and year-end bonuses set on the basis of individual, group, and
firm performance. See Bannier et al., supra note 12, at 654; Murphy, supra note 80, at 4. R
109 See infra Tables 1, 2 and accompanying text.
110 See infra Tables 3, 4 and accompanying text.
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increase in compensation that failed to take account of the increased
risk taking that arose from each bank’s interest in hiring the strongest
performers.  We turn to those findings next.
A. Nonexecutive Incentives and Bank Performance
Public data on bank nonexecutive pay are limited.  The Bank
Regulatory database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,111 which
collects quarterly data on, among other items, bank balance sheets
and income statements, only provides information on total compensa-
tion (for executives and nonexecutives).  Unlike data on top manage-
ment compensation, which are available from the ExecuComp
database,112 no dedicated database exists for nonexecutive pay.
The solution is to derive changes in nonexecutive pay from
changes in total bank compensation.  Nonexecutive pay can be mea-
sured for each bank by computing how it adjusts its quarterly total
compensation (obtained from the Bank Regulatory database), net of
its quarterly executive pay (obtained from the ExecuComp database).
In order to assess incentive effect, quarterly cumulative changes in
pay113 can then be related to the quarter’s variation in bank profits (as
a proxy for bank performance, obtained from the Bank Regulatory
database).  Computing changes on a quarterly basis is important be-
cause it captures the sensitivity of nonexecutive incentives to short-
term bank performance.  Also important is differentiating the compo-
nents of pay in order to verify whether cash and stock compensation
have different effects.  Accordingly, the following measures were esti-
mated for each bank over the period 2003–2006:114  (i) CASH COMP.
INCENT.—computed as the quarterly cumulative variation in total sal-
ary, bonus, and net benefits granted to each bank’s nonexecutives
111 The Bank Regulatory Database collects financial information that the Fed and the
FDIC require all bank holding companies to file using FR Y-9C reports.  Pursuant to the
Bank Holding Company Act, a bank holding company is defined as “any company which
has control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding com-
pany.”  12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2012).  For a detailed description of the financial informa-
tion bank holding companies are required to disclose in FR Y-9C reports, see BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FORM FR Y-9C (last updated Dec. 19, 2014), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/apps/reportforms/reportdetail.aspx?sOoYJ+5BzDal8cbqnRxZ
Rg==.
112 The ExecuComp database provides information on executives at S&P 1000 firms,
including information on salaries, bonuses, and stock options since 1992.  Note that, be-
cause the ExecuComp database only provides data on an annual basis, the data are pro-
rated in the estimates employed in Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at R
7–8.
113 Quarterly cumulative changes in pay are computed as the pay a nonexecutive re-
ceives in a given year until quarter t (inclusive) minus the pay she received until quarter t–1
(also inclusive).
114 For the technical specifications of these measures, see Acharya et al., Non-Executive
Incentives, supra note 12, at 9 (Equation 1). R
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relative to the quarter’s variation in bank profits; (ii) STOCK COMP.
INCENT.—computed as the quarterly cumulative variation in total pay-
ments in stock granted to each bank’s nonexecutives relative to the
quarter’s variation in bank profits; and (iii) TOTAL COMP. INCENT.—
computed as the quarterly cumulative variation in total salary, bonus,
net benefits, and stock granted to each bank’s nonexecutives relative
to the quarter’s variation in bank profits.
Identifying the distinct roles played by market-wide and firm-
specific effects in setting nonexecutive incentives is also critical.
Nonexecutive cash incentives (CASH COMP. INCENT.) were divided into
two components, one for market effects (CASH COMP. INCENT. (MAR-
KET)) and the other for firm effects (CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM)).115
The market-effects component measures the quarterly cumulative
cash compensation variation for each bank relative to the quarter’s
variation in market profits.  For each bank, the “market” corresponds
to a reference peer group comprised of five other banks whose head-
quarters are located in the same state or neighboring states.116  The
firm-effects component measures the quarterly cumulative cash com-
pensation variation for each bank relative to the quarter’s variation in
individual bank profits after market effects are taken into account.117
TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MAIN VARIABLES
Mean Standard Deviation
Independent Variables (2003–2006)118
CASH COMP. INCENT. 0.98 0.75
STOCK COMP. INCENT. 0.89 1.10
TOTAL COMP. INCENT. 0.97 0.07
CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) 1.00 0.09
CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM) 0.07 4.46
Dependent Variables (2007–2009)
Bank Risk 0.07 0.04
Bank Value 1.05 0.17
115 For a more detailed discussion of the specific econometric technique employed to
separate market effects and firm effects, see id. at 10 (Equation 2).
116 For example, Citigroup’s peer group includes five other bank holding companies
headquartered in New York: JPMorgan Chase & Co., Metlife Inc., Bank of New York Mel-
lon Corp., M&T Bank Corp., and New York Community Bancorp Inc. See id. at 11–12
(describing in more detail the construction of peer groups).
117 As compared to CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET), CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM) is de-
signed to measure changes in a bank’s compensation relative to changes in profits that are
specific to that bank and uncorrelated to changes in market profits. See id. at 10–12.
118 The statistical data on independent variables in 1 are based on a sample of eighty-
eight U.S. bank holding companies, while the regressions described in the text are based
on a sample of seventy-seven U.S. bank holding companies.  Regressions were not possible
for eleven U.S. bank holding companies that went out of business during 2007–2009.
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Table 1 sets out mean and standard deviation data for the main
variables used in this Article’s empirical analysis.  The data confirm
that bank employee compensation was mainly driven by short-term
(quarterly) bank profits.  As shown in the first column (mean), a
$1.00 quarterly increase (decrease) in bank profits corresponded on
average to a 98¢ increase (decrease) in cumulative cash compensation
in the next quarter, and a $1.00 quarterly increase (decrease) in mar-
ket profits corresponded on average to a $1.00 increase (decrease) in
cumulative cash compensation in the next quarter.
Significantly, once market effects were taken into account, a
$1.00 quarterly increase (decrease) in an individual bank’s relative
profits corresponded on average to only a 7¢ increase (decrease) in
cumulative bank employee cash compensation.  This suggests, consis-
tent with our earlier analysis,119 that the bulk of the effect on em-
ployee compensation was tied to changes in market profits rather than
individual bank earnings.  Compensation for nonexecutive employees
was essentially driven by market-wide results rather than by how well a
specific bank performed relative to the industry.
B. Nonexecutive Incentives and Bank Risk Taking
In subpart A, we showed that nonexecutive incentives during
2003–2006 were predominantly tied to short-term market profits.  The
next step is to verify the impact of those incentives on longer-term
bank risk.  Our claim was that nonexecutive incentives promoted
riskier strategies whose results emerged during the financial crisis.120
Bank risk, therefore, was estimated as aggregate risk during
2007–2009,121 using the standard deviation of a bank’s weekly excess
return (defined as the weekly return of a bank’s stock, less the weekly
return of the S&P 500) over the calendar year.
As shown in Table 2, the greater a bank’s nonexecutive incentives
were during 2003–2006, the greater the bank risk during 2007–2009.
This finding is consistent with our conclusion that a rise in the compe-
tition for talent would cause a bank to rely on short-term performance
119 See supra notes 80–82, 104 and accompanying text. R
120 See supra notes 87–88, 106–07 and accompanying text. R
121 It is unlikely that high bank risk during the financial crisis determined precrisis
nonexecutive pay, since this would imply that banks and the market for nonexecutives
were able to anticipate the effects of the financial crisis before they occurred and adjust
nonexecutive pay in anticipation of those effects.  Measuring nonexecutive incentives before
the financial crisis and bank risk only during the financial crisis mitigates endogeneity con-
cerns. See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at 21, 31–32 (“[I]t is reason- R
able to assume that financial markets and financial firms were unable to properly
anticipate the effects of the crisis and adjust nonexecutive incentives to reflect such
anticipation.”).
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in setting employee pay (2003–2006), without adjusting it to account
for risk taking and longer-term (2007–2009) outcomes.122
TABLE 2.  BANK RISK AND COMPENSATION INCENTIVES123
Bank Risk (2007–2009)
Independent Variables (2003–2006) (1) (2) (3)
CASH COMP. INCENT. 0.0516***
t-stat (3.98)
STOCK COMP. INCENT. -0.0005*
t-stat (1.75)
TOTAL COMP. INCENT. 0.066***
t-stat (3.03)
Percentage Effect124 30.5% -4.3% 37.7%
Observations 231 231 231
Adjusted R-squared 41% 40% 41%
Table 2 shows that all nonexecutive incentives had an impact on
bank risk that is statistically significant, but the direction of the impact
varied.  Specifically, for CASH COMP. INCENT. (column 1), there was a
positive effect on bank risk.  This means that the more sensitive nonex-
ecutive cash compensation (total salary, bonus, and net benefits) was
to a bank’s profits in 2003–2006, the greater the increase in bank risk
122 See supra notes 85–86, 99–100 and accompanying text.  Although compensation was R
not the sole cause of the financial crisis, its effect on risk was widely recognized as an
important cause of the losses that resulted. See INST. OF INT’L FIN., COMPENSATION IN FINAN-
CIAL SERVICES: INDUSTRY PROGRESS AND THE AGENDA FOR CHANGE 2, 10 (2009), available at
www.iif.com/download.php?id=YgXfGGw8KEA= (stating that 98 percent of survey respon-
dents believed that compensation practices were one cause of the financial crisis); SENIOR
SUPERVISORS GRP., OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES DURING THE RECENT
MARKET TURBULENCE 7 (2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/
banking/2008/SSG_Risk_Mgt_doc_final.pdf (noting that for many firms compensation
and other incentives were not sufficiently well designed to balance risk appetite and risk
control); UBS, SHAREHOLDER REPORT ON UBS’S WRITE-DOWNS 32, 41–42 (2008), available at
http://www.ubs.com/1/ShowMedia/investors/agm?contentId=140333&name=080418
ShareholderReport.pdf (finding the incentive effects of UBS’s compensation practices to
be one overarching cause of its subprime mortgage losses); Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate
Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 2009 FIN. MARKET TRENDS 61, 72–76 (2009) (stat-
ing that remuneration and incentive systems played a key role in favoring excessive bank
risk taking).
123 The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
This means that the null hypothesis (the hypothesis that an independent variable has no
impact on a dependent variable) cannot be rejected with a probability of 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.  In statistics, when the significance level is above 10%, it is standard to
consider the result to be statistically insignificant or uninformative.
124 The percentage effects correspond to a one standard deviation increase in the
dependent variable (bank risk) given a one standard deviation increase in the independent
variables (the measures of nonexecutive incentives). See Acharya et al., Non-Executive
Incentives, supra note 12, at 25 n.20 (including a detailed discussion of the computations R
underlying the calculation of each percentage effect).
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over the period 2007–2009.  The economic significance of this effect
is notable, with CASH COMP. INCENT. being responsible on average for
a 30.5 percent increase in bank risk during the financial crisis.  By con-
trast, for STOCK COMP. INCENT. (column 2), there was a negative effect
on bank risk—meaning that the more sensitive nonexecutive stock
compensation was to a bank’s profits in 2003–2006, the lower the bank
risk in 2007–2009.
Both results are consistent with our theoretical analysis.  With
growth in the competition for talent, and a reliance on near-term per-
formance to set compensation, nonexecutive cash compensation
failed to reflect the resulting increase in risk-taking incentives.125 Stock
compensation, however, involves different dynamics, especially in the
form of restricted stock and other deferred equity plans.  This kind of
incentive is more likely to internalize the costs of an employee’s risk
taking, because higher risk is likely to correlate with lower future stock
values.126
In our sample of banks, stock compensation accounted on aver-
age for only 2 percent of total compensation, with the remaining 98
percent comprised of cash.127  The principal reliance on cash com-
pensation explains the overall effect of nonexecutive pay in increasing
bank risk.  It is also consistent with the influence of market demand on
how nonexecutive pay is set.  Compensation tied to longer-term re-
sults becomes less attractive as it becomes more common to reward
employees for short-term performance.  For employees, a cash bonus
is likely to be more desirable than equal compensation in stock whose
value may not be realized until the future.  Consequently, in a compet-
itive market, employees—and the employers interested in making the
best hires—are more likely to favor cash over stock compensation.128
125 See supra notes 85–86, 99–100 and accompanying text.  As financial regulators re- R
ported in the wake of the financial crisis, “[h]istorical compensation arrangements were
generally not sensitive to risk and skewed incentives to maximize revenues. . . .  Firms
largely acknowledged that current compensation practices, or those in place prior to the
crisis, created strong incentives to maximize revenues rather than risk-, capital-, and
liquidity-adjusted earnings.” See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GRP., supra note 86, at 24. R
126 Those results contrast with the analysis of executive compensation in Bebchuk &
Spamann, supra note 9, at 275–76 (“[R]estricted stock could tie executive payoffs to an R
even more highly levered bet on the value of the assets of the bank, and thus, give execu-
tives highly distorted incentives [to engage in excessive risk taking].”), but support the
compensation proposal made in Bhagat & Romano, supra note 9, at 363–71, as well as our R
own proposal to require that a component of nonexecutive compensation be tied to long-
term equity. See infra Part III.C.
127 See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at 3, 19, 22; see also Bernard R
S. Sharfman, Using the Law to Reduce Systemic Risk, 36 J. CORP. L. 607, 616–17 (2011)
(describing reliance on annual cash bonuses).
128 Employers who choose to reflect long-term performance in what they pay may also
need to increase the value the employee can realize over time in order to remain competi-
tive. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay,
but How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV., 138, 149 (1990) (describing how talented workers may shun
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Earlier we noted that nonexecutive pay is largely tied to market
profits.129  Based on that finding, we suspected that the effect of
nonexecutive incentives on bank risk was primarily driven by their mar-
ket component.  The empirical results in Table 3 below support our
view.
TABLE 3.  BANK RISK AND CASH COMPENSATION INCENTIVES:
MARKET AND FIRM130
Bank Risk (2007–2009)
Independent Variables (2003–2006)
CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) 0.0635***
t-stat (4.99)
CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM) -0.00031
t-stat (1.19)
Percentage Effect131 40.0%
-10.9%
Observations 231
Adjusted R-squared 43.3%
We focus here on nonexecutive cash compensation (CASH COMP.
INCENT.), because, as noted earlier, this was the dominant component
of nonexecutive pay before the financial crisis.132  Table 3 shows that,
once market factors are separated from firm factors, the effect of
CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) on bank risk is significantly greater
than CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM).  The effect of CASH COMP. INCENT.
(MARKET) is positive and statistically significant, leading to an average
increase in bank risk of 40 percent.  By contrast, the effect of CASH
COMP. INCENT. (FIRM) on bank risk is statistically insignificant.
the corporate sector because of the weak relation between pay and performance).  For
example, if a bank continues to do well over the long term, the amount the employee gains
on her restricted stock or stock options should be greater than what she would have re-
ceived up front in cash.  This may partly account for the 8 percent drop in Wall Street cash
bonuses in 2010, but the overall increase in pay—largely comprised of deferred compensa-
tion—by 6 percent during the same year. See Brett Philbin, Wall Street Cash Bonuses Fall,
Despite Strong Profit, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052748703775704576162731016064512.
129 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. R
130 The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
See supra note 123. R
131 The percentage effects correspond to a one standard deviation increase in the
dependent variable (bank risk) given a one standard deviation increase in the independent
variables (CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) and CASH COMP. INCENT.  (FIRM)). See Acharya et
al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at 26 (including a detailed discussion of the
computations underlying the calculation of each percentage effect).
132 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. R
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Finally, we note that the results in Table 3, as well as in Table 4
that follows, were controlled for executive incentives (measured over
the same period as nonexecutive incentives, 2003–2006) and the re-
sults persisted133—meaning that executive incentives can be excluded
as an explanation of the effects on bank risk shown in those tables.134
Importantly, this confirms our claim that changes in executive pay
had limited effect on changes in nonexecutive risk taking.  Greater
homogeneity in the financial markets135 caused nonexecutive pay to
no longer be a choice made by a bank’s top executives, but instead
increasingly to be determined by the market’s demand for talent.136
C. Nonexecutive Incentives and Bank Value
So far we have considered the impact of bank nonexecutive in-
centives on risk taking without analyzing whether they were efficient
or inefficient.  Bank compensation that promotes riskier strategies is
not necessarily inefficient,137 for example, if it is associated with a high
133 The regressions in Tables 3 and 4 were also controlled for several additional vari-
ables (estimated during 2003–2006) that were likely to have an impact on bank risk, includ-
ing: (i) bank size, (ii) past bank profitability (ROA), (iii) total deposits to total assets,
(iv) Tier-1 capital to total assets, (v) total loans to total assets, (vi) past bad loans to total
assets, (vii) ratio of underwriter assets to total bank assets, (viii) ratio of insurance assets to
total bank assets, (ix) ratio of derivative products trading to total assets, and (x) ratio of
derivative hedging to total assets.  Control (i) is included because large banks are more
likely to benefit from various forms of governmental support and, therefore, they may have
greater incentives to engage in excessive risk taking.  Control (ii) reflects the possibility
that banks that have previously failed to achieve expected returns may be more inclined to
undertake riskier investments.  Control (iii) is included because deposits are a financial
source that is largely insensitive to risk (due to FDIC insurance) and, therefore, banks with
more deposit funding may be more prone to taking excessive risk.  Control (iv) is included
because banks that are less well capitalized tend to be more exposed to insolvency and,
therefore, more sensitive to changes in risk.  Finally, controls (v)–(x) are included because
the indicated lines of business may directly impact future bank risk and value. See Acharya
et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, app. at tbl.2. R
134 Executive incentives were measured through CEO Delta, which estimates the sensi-
tivity of CEO compensation to stock price (i.e., the percent change in the value of the CEO
option portfolio for a one percent increase in stock price), and CEO Vega, which estimates
the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock-return volatility (i.e., the percent change in
the value of the CEO option portfolio for a one percent increase in the volatility of the
returns on the underlying stock). See John Core & Wayne Guay, Estimating the Value of
Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 613,
629 (2002).
135 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. R
136 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. R
137 In fact, the main concern with managerial risk choices has long been that undiver-
sified managers may have incentives to select projects that are too conservative from the
shareholders’ perspective. REBECCA S. DEMSETZ ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., AGENCY
PROBLEMS AND RISK TAKING AT BANKS 1–2 (1997), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/staff_reports/research_papers/9709.pdf (“[T]he owner/manager agency prob-
lem is characterized by excessively safe behavior on the part of the manager, who pursues
his own objectives at the expense of better diversified shareholders.”).  Conservative
projects have the opposite effect of increased risk taking, expropriating wealth from diver-
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(long-term) expected return.138  Our claim, however, is that the nega-
tive externality that results from the competition for bank talent
caused bank nonexecutive incentives to be inefficient.139  Greater em-
ployee mobility limited the banks’ ability to structure nonexecutive
incentives to efficiently manage a banker’s effort choices (inducing
her to refrain from self-interested conduct) and risk choices (induc-
ing her to undertake an optimal level of risk).140
Empirically, our claim can be tested by relating bank nonexecu-
tive incentives before the financial crisis (2003–2006) to bank value,
measured as the bank’s average Tobin’s Q (the ratio of the bank’s mar-
ket value of assets over its book value of assets)141 during the financial
crisis (2007–2009).  Again, the empirical evidence confirms our
sified shareholders to the benefit of fixed claimants, including wage-compensated manag-
ers. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 37, at 353. R
138 Within modern scholarship, the link between risk and expected return was first
studied by William F. Sharpe. See William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964).
139 See supra notes 87–88, 100 and accompanying text. R
140 See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. R
141 Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value (defined as the firm’s total liabilities,
minus its deferred taxes and investment tax credits, plus the value of its preferred stock
and the market value of its common stock) divided by the replacement cost of its assets. See
Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About
Dividends and Debt, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 8 (2002).  The measure was introduced by James
Tobin in A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, 1 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
15 (1969).  Tobin’s Q has become a commonly recognized proxy for market valuation. See,
e.g., Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 47
(1995) (“Tobin’s q-ratio is also widely used in studies examining how the level of firm value
varies with firm structure.”); Larry H. P. Lang & Rene´ M. Stulz, Tobin’s Q, Corporate Diversifi-
cation, and Firm Performance, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1248, 1250 (1994) (“Comparing the Tobin’s
q of diversified firms to the Tobin’s q of specialized firms, we find that . . . single-industry
firms are valued more highly by the capital markets than diversified firms.”); Randall
Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN.
ECON. 293, 294 (1988) (describing Tobin’s Q as “our proxy for market valuation of the
firm’s assets”); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of
Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 186 (1996) (finding an “inverse relation between firm mar-
ket value, as represented by Tobin’s Q, and the size of the board of directors”).  One major
advantage of Tobin’s Q is its computational simplicity.  All of its determinants are retrieva-
ble from existing data sources such as, for example, the Compustat database.  Tobin’s Q,
however, is not without its critics.  First, market value may not reflect the marginal cost of
capital but instead may reflect the average cost of capital.  In that case, firm value may not
be properly captured by Tobin’s Q. See Joao F. Gomes, Financing Investment, 91 AM. ECON.
REV. 1263, 1264–65 (2001); see also Eric B. Lindenberg & Stephen A. Ross, Tobin’s q Ratio
and Industrial Organization, 54 J. BUS. 1, 9 (1981) (“The value of q only provides an upper
bound to monopoly power; a firm may have a true index below the bound.”).  Second,
Tobin’s Q may not reflect an accurate valuation of the firm due to market irrationality.
Irrationality could be significant if investor sentiment drives valuations in the stock market.
See Malcolm Baker et al., When Does the Market Matter?  Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-
Dependent Firms, 118 Q.J. ECON. 969, 969–70 (2003).  With those caveats in mind, Tobin’s Q
is still a commonly accepted measure of firm valuation, including within the scholarship on
corporate governance. See, e.g., Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,
118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 126 (2003) (“Our valuation measure is Tobin’s Q, which has been used
for this purpose in corporate-governance studies . . . .”).
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explanation.  Table 4 shows that bank employee compensation had a
negative effect on bank value, suggesting that the risk taking that re-
sulted from precrisis nonexecutive incentives was inefficient and,
hence, so were the incentives.142
TABLE 4.  BANK VALUE AND COMPENSATION INCENTIVES143
Bank Value (2007–2009)
Independent Variables (2003–2006) (1) (2) (3)
CASH COMP. INCENT. -0.095***
t-stat (4.52)
STOCK COMP. INCENT. 0.0036***
t-stat (3.46)
TOTAL COMP. INCENT. -0.0873***
t-stat (10.91)
CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) -0.1024**
t-stat (3.37)
CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM) 0.0008
t-stat (0.69)
Percentage Effect144 -14.4% -12.8% -16.6%
8.0% 7.2%
Observations 231 231 231
Adjusted R-squared 57.3% 57.0% 58.0%
In particular, column 2 shows that total nonexecutive compensa-
tion (TOTAL COMP. INCENT.) had a statistically significant negative ef-
fect on bank value, accounting for an average reduction of 12.8
percent during the financial crisis.  That effect increased when consid-
ering only the cash component of nonexecutive pay, with CASH COMP.
INCENT. (column 1) accounting for an average reduction in value of
14.4 percent during the financial crisis.  By contrast, the stock compo-
nent of nonexecutive pay, STOCK COMP. INCENT. (also column 1), had
a statistically significant positive impact on bank value, accounting for
an average increase of 8 percent during the financial crisis.  This re-
sult is consistent with our claim that stock compensation is more likely
to internalize the negative effect of excessive risk taking.145  Neverthe-
142 Like the bank risk regressions in Tables 2 and 3, all of the bank value regressions in
Table 4 include several control variables, including executive incentives and the additional
variables specified in supra  note 133.  The results remained unchanged when the controls R
were included. See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, app. at tbl.11. R
143 The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
See supra note 123. R
144 The percentage effects correspond to a one standard deviation increase in the
dependent variable (bank value) given a one standard deviation increase in the
independent variables (the measures of nonexecutive incentives). See Acharya et al., Non-
Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at 27 (including a detailed discussion of the R
computations underlying the calculation of the percentage effects).
145 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. R
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less, as we observed earlier, stock compensation accounted on average
for only 2 percent of total nonexecutive pay, explaining why the over-
all effect on bank value was negative, driven largely by nonexecutive
cash compensation.146  This also explains the lower effect of TOTAL
COMP. INCENT. on bank value, compared to CASH COMP. INCENT., be-
cause total nonexecutive compensation included the marginal effect
of stock compensation.
Finally, column 3 shows the effect on bank value of the market
and firm-specific components of cash compensation.  Similar to our
prior results,147 the effect of CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) on bank
value dominated CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM). Specifically, CASH
COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) had a statistically significant negative effect
on bank value, being responsible on average for a drop in value of 16.6
percent during the financial crisis, while the effect of CASH COMP. IN-
CENT. (FIRM) on bank value was statistically insignificant.
* * *
The empirical results in this Part confirm our claim that, in a
competitive labor market, it is difficult for any one bank employer to
implement pay incentives that can adjust for risk taking and long-term
outcomes.148  Specifically, we demonstrate the following:
(i) Market factors were primarily responsible for setting bank
non-executive incentives that largely focused on short-term
performance.149
(ii) Those incentives promoted employee strategies that in-
creased bank risk prior to the financial crisis.150
(iii) Increasing bank risk was inefficient, causing a significant de-
cline in bank value during the financial crisis.151
As a result, competitive payoffs rose as each bank sought to hire
the same talent, reinforcing an industry-wide increase in compensa-
tion.152  Underlying the run-up were an informational problem and a
coordination problem.  The informational problem arose from each
bank’s inability to assess the employees’ risk-adjusted results in the
short term.153  The coordination problem arose from each bank’s nat-
ural interest in hiring the same nonexecutives—in the process, re-
warding employees who enhanced short-term performance at the
146 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. R
147 See supra notes 119, 129–32 and accompanying text. R
148 See supra notes 87–88, 100 and accompanying text. R
149 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. R
150 See supra Table 2 and notes 125–27, 132 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text. R
152 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. R
153 See supra notes 85–86, 99 and accompanying text. R
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expense of riskier strategies and longer-term losses.154  Both problems
can benefit from regulatory change, and in the next Part, we consider
three proposals that respond to the problems identified in this Article.
III
REGULATING THE COMPETITION FOR TALENT
In this Part, we propose three regulatory changes to address
problems that can arise from competition’s effects on compensation.
The prudential regulation of banks reflects their importance as finan-
cial intermediaries and the costs of a banking crisis—particularly the
negative externalities that can arise from bank risk taking.155  Much of
financial regulation induces banks to internalize those costs, reducing
externalities by restricting the amounts and types of risk a bank can
bear.156  In general, it does so by circumscribing a bank’s investment
assets and capital structure157 and through rules regarding net worth,
capital, and surplus that effectively cap risk-taking activities.158  To-
gether, they moderate risk by regulating the asset and liability sides of
a bank’s balance sheet.159
Those rules also affect bank profitability and employee compen-
sation.160  What they fail to do is directly address the incentives of non-
executives who actually incur risk.  The focus instead has been on
regulating executives, as the bank’s top decisionmakers.161  The
154 See supra notes 87–88, 100 and accompanying text. R
155 A standard example of a negative externality in the banking industry is a bank run
that arises from a bank’s decision to assume a risky loan portfolio.  Concerns over the
bank’s financial stability may become substantial, causing depositors to run on the bank to
withdraw funds. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance,
and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (providing a seminal model on financial inter-
mediation and bank runs).  In addition to affecting the bank and its managers, sharehold-
ers, and customers, other banks may experience a decline in business, or even a run, as
concerns over financial stability spread across the financial markets.  Borrowers, as a result,
may not be able to obtain funding at the same cost, restricting their ability to invest in new,
value-enhancing projects and causing a slowdown in the general economy. See Ben S.
Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression,
73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 264–65, 271 (1983); Charles W. Calomiris, Is Deposit Insurance Neces-
sary?  A Historical Perspective, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 283, 284 (1990).
156 See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1,
15–18, 23–24 (1976); Jackson, supra note 57, at 352–59; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. R
Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1153, 1155, 1165 (1988).
157 See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 47–48
(2010) (providing examples of regulatory limits on investment assets and capital
structure).
158 See id. at 49–50; see also Charles K. Whitehead, What’s Your Sign?—International
Norms, Signals, and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 695, 721–25 (2006) (detailing interna-
tional efforts).
159 See Clark, supra note 156, at 47. R
160 See Thanassoulis, supra note 11, at 853. R
161 See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text. R
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presumption that, by regulating executive pay, each bank’s managers
will appropriately set nonexecutive incentives is consistent with an ap-
proach to regulation that, to date, largely considers each bank sepa-
rately.162  At odds with that approach is the market-wide competition
for the best employees.  Higher pay can encourage a nonexecutive to
pursue a tail-risk strategy if she can sidestep the long-term conse-
quences by switching jobs.163  Lower pay can also encourage tail risk if
higher short-term performance makes it easier to negotiate a hike in
compensation from a new, higher-paying employer.164  The result has
been a decline in the ability of any one bank to set compensation that
efficiently balances performance and risk taking.165
Of course, regulating executive pay can increase an executive’s
interest in monitoring (and controlling) nonexecutive risk taking.
Doing so, however, may be difficult to do in real time as new risks are
incurred.  Leeson, Tourre, and Iksil each alleged they were supervised
by managers who knew (or should have known) about the risks they
took.166  Employees may also minimize their managers’ ability to su-
pervise their activities and assess their performance.167  Moreover, su-
pervisors themselves may be interested in incurring greater risk to the
extent a subordinate’s better performance enhances their own
compensation.168
162 See MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REG-
ULATION 2–4, 14–15 (2009); ANDREW CROCKETT, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, MARRYING
THE MICRO- AND MACRO-PRUDENTIAL DIMENSIONS OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 3 (2000), available
at http://www.bis.org/speeches/desp000921.htm (“The quintessential micro-prudential
dictum is that ‘financial stability is ensured as long as each and every institution is sound.’”
(emphasis omitted)).  One of us has questioned whether that approach is outdated in light
of convergence in the financial markets.  See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 360 (2011) (“Expanding the scope of regulation beyond individ-
ual firms . . . can help fill gaps in today’s regulatory framework.”).
163 See supra notes 96–99, 104–05 and accompanying text. R
164 See Eric Dash, Effort to Rein in Pay on Wall St. Hits New Hurdle: The Guaranteed Bonus,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at A1 (describing competition for talent among firms subject to
“pay czar” oversight and those that are not).
165 Recall, from Figure 1, that a high risk Employee who has performed well in the
short term is interested in moving firms before losses from her high risk strategy material-
ize.  The new employer may pay no more in the short term than the existing employer, but
changing jobs permits the high risk Employee to avoid the long-term effects of her strategy
and enhance total compensation. See supra fig.1 and accompanying text.
166 See U.S. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 14, 52, 66–67 (explaining Bruno Iksil’s role R
in JPMorgan trades); JOHN E. MARTHINSEN, RISK TAKERS: USES AND ABUSES OF FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES 219–22 (Denise Clinton et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009). Compare Complaint at para.
4, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 1:10-cv-03229 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 16, 2010) (accusing
Tourre of being “principally responsible for ABACUS”), with Answer of Defendant at para.
4, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 1:10-cv-03229 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 19, 2010) (denying
allegations except admitting Tourre “was one of many” employees involved in the
transaction).
167 See supra notes 37–42, 86 and accompanying text. R
168 The potential for a supervisor to prefer that subordinates adopt high-risk strategies
is consistent with concerns over moral hazard that can arise within partnerships when per-
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The more radical insight is that executives may not be able to set
efficient nonexecutive pay even when they have the incentive to do so.
Executives may be concerned that limits on risk taking are too tight—
restricting an employee’s ability to enhance short-term compensation
and causing the best performers to move elsewhere.  In other words,
even when—perhaps, precisely when—acting in the bank’s best inter-
ests, executives will still be trapped into providing risk-prone incen-
tives to nonexecutives due to the negative externality that arises from
the competition for talent.169
New regulation that fails to account for a competitive talent mar-
ket is incomplete.  We, therefore, argue for three regulatory changes
to plug this gap—first, directing regulators to consider the effect of
competition on market-wide levels of compensation; second, limiting
the ability of nonexecutives to move from a bank to another financial
firm; and third, requiring some portion of nonexecutive pay to in-
clude a long-term equity component, with subsequent employers be-
ing restricted from compensating her for any losses she incurs related
to her prior work.170
formance is measured jointly on the basis of team (rather than individual) productivity. See
Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 325, 327 (1982).
169 The concern is not merely theoretical.  In 2011, Goldman Sachs’s shareholders
brought a derivative suit against the firm’s directors alleging they had breached their fidu-
ciary duties by, among other things, failing to properly analyze and rationally set compen-
sation levels for Goldman Sachs’s employees. See In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc.
S’holder Litig., No. 5215–VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).  In par-
ticular, they claimed that because the directors “consistently based compensation for the
firm’s management on a percentage of net revenue, Goldman’s employees had a motiva-
tion to grow net revenue at any cost and without regard to risk.” Id. at *1.  The Delaware
Chancery Court dismissed the case, observing that “[t]he decision as to how much com-
pensation is appropriate to retain and incentivize employees, both individually and in the
aggregate, is a core function of a board of directors exercising its business judgment.” Id.
at *14.  Our analysis supports the suit’s dismissal, but for almost the opposite reason—
namely, that directors should not be held liable for nonexecutive compensation practices
that are largely determined by the market’s demand for talent over which they have only
limited control.
170 This Article’s principal focus has been on nonexecutive pay in light of the signifi-
cant contribution of nonexecutives to risk taking during 2003–2006 and the resulting de-
cline in bank value in 2007–2009, independent of the effects of executive pay. See supra
notes 133–36 and accompanying text.  Of course, the failure of executives to properly over- R
see employees is likely to have contributed to the losses banks suffered during the financial
crisis. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.  Efforts to improve oversight are not R
inconsistent with the proposals we make here.  In fact, adapting this Article’s proposals for
senior managers may help address concerns over their own incentives to properly manage
risk.  Our point is that the current focus on executive pay, without taking account of the
market’s demand for nonexecutive talent, is incomplete. See supra notes 10–16 and accom- R
panying text.
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A. Assessing Competition and Compensation
Reflecting change in the financial markets,171 regulators should
extend their assessment of compensation beyond individual banks to
include the effect of competition on market-wide levels of pay.  That
approach differs from the Compensation Guidance adopted by U.S.
bank regulators.  The Compensation Guidance requires each bank to
ensure its incentives appropriately balance risk and financial re-
sults.172  Missing from the Guidance, however, is an assessment of how
the competition for talent affects a bank’s short-term incentives.  In
order to assess pay, the bank (and its regulators) must also consider
the effects on risk taking of the incentives other employers offer.173
Those employers are not limited to banks.174  In a converging world,
the competition for talent extends beyond banks to others who offer
similar products and services, including investment banks and hedge
funds.175
The need to match what others pay is well known to bank execu-
tives.176  It may, however, be difficult for banks to fully assess the com-
pensation arrangements of others.  Likewise, it may be difficult for
regulators who review a bank’s compensation structure in isolation to
fully assess its risk-taking effects.  For that reason, bank and other
financial market regulators should be required to coordinate their
oversight of compensation.177  Analyzing compensation in a vacuum
fails to reflect the competitive labor market within which incentives
are assessed by the employees themselves.178
171 See supra Part I.A.
172 See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,398.  See the Appendix for a R
description of the Compensation Guidance’s core principles.
173 See supra notes 99, 104–05 and accompanying text. R
174 Our proposal differs from others that argue that regulating compensation can be
limited to banks. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9, at 285 (“Because regulating R
executive pay can improve the effectiveness of banking regulation in achieving its widely
accepted goals, it could be appropriate to constrain banks’ freedom to set pay structures
while not imposing such constraints outside the banking sector.”).
175 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. R
176 See Tett, supra note 19; Smith, supra note 86. R
177 Coordination among regulators may be facilitated by adoption of the proposed
rules appearing in Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170,
21,172–74 (proposed April 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 42 (OCC), pt. 236
(Fed), pt. 372 (FDIC), pt. 563h (OTS), pts. 741, 751 (National Credit Union Administra-
tion (NCUA)), 17 C.F.R. pt. 248 (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)), 12 C.F.R.
pt. 1232 (Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)) [hereinafter Jointly Proposed Incen-
tive Rules].  Note, however, that those proposed rules would not extend to all financial
regulators, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or state insurance regu-
lators.  A summary description of the Jointly Proposed Incentive Rules appears in the
Appendix.
178 Among its tasks, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is charged with
identifying risks to U.S. financial stability arising from activities in or outside the financial
markets. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112, 12
U.S.C. § 5322 (2012).  The FSOC must “identify gaps in regulation that could pose risks to”
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One alternative to monitoring compensation is to impose a com-
pensation cap179 that limits the amount a firm can pay.  The Euro-
pean Union proposed a pay ceiling, although it has not been
implemented.180  Compensation caps are intended to minimize risk
taking by limiting incentives to pursue a high-risk strategy.  Yet, as ex-
plained below, they are only a partial response to the fluid market for
bank talent and its impact on nonexecutive incentives.
Consider again competition’s effects on risk taking and compen-
sation, originally diagramed in Figure 1 but now illustrated in Figure 2
with a compensation cap.
U.S. financial stability, § 5322(a)(2)(G), as well as make recommendations to primary reg-
ulators to “apply new or heightened standards and safeguards for financial activities or
practices that could create or increase risks” among financial firms and markets,
§ 5322(a)(2)(K).  In addition to the Jointly Proposed Incentive Rules, see supra note 177, R
this broad grant of authority offers one basis for financial regulators, under the FSOC’s
guidance, to begin assessing the effect of greater competition for talent on compensation
and risk-taking incentives.
179 Here we refer to limits on total compensation, not caps on bonuses or other incen-
tive pay.  A cap on incentive pay is likely to result only in the deck chairs being rearranged
from bonuses to increased salary. See Daniel Scha¨fer & Tom Braithwaite, Bankers Look for
Ways Round Bonus Caps, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
9b8d8f48-81cb-11e2-b050-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2WD359gql.  Competition’s effect on
compensation and risk taking, described in this Article, would be largely unchanged, al-
though the resulting rise in fixed expense could create greater bank instability. See
Thanassoulis, supra note 11, at 849–50 (claiming that competition for bank employees gen- R
erates a negative externality by increasing compensation and rival banks’ default risk);
Murphy, supra note 80, at 14–15.  Professor Thanassoulis demonstrates how a modest cap
on bonuses set by reference to a bank’s balance sheet can lower default risk among larger
banks as well as lessen the competition for employees. See Thanassoulis, supra note 11, at R
868–69.  His model, however, differs from this Article’s analysis through its premise on
(i) a population of bankers with publicly observable skills and (ii) bank remuneration and
risk being internally decided. See id. at 850.  The model also contemplates continued dif-
ferences in compensation levels among banks, but does not address the effect of those
differences on the risk-taking incentives of nonexecutives. See id. at 852.
180 In February 2013, the European Union provisionally agreed to limit bankers’ in-
centive compensation to an amount equal to their fixed salary (a one-to-one ratio) that
could be increased to twice their fixed salary (a two-to-one ratio) with the approval of a
supermajority of shareholders.  Increases in base salary, therefore, would raise the total
compensation that can be paid in line with the competition for talent.  The new limit was
to be finalized by June 2013, see Murphy, supra note 80, at 1, but is subject to continuing
review, see EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, EBA FINAL DRAFT REGULATORY TECHNICAL STAN-
DARDS ON CRITERIA TO IDENTIFY CATEGORIES OF STAFF WHOSE PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES HAVE
A MATERIAL IMPACT ON AN INSTITUTION’S RISK PROFILE UNDER ARTICLE 94(2) OF DIRECTIVE
2013/36/EU 5 (2013), available at http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/526386/
EBA-RTS-2013-11+%28Ond¸entified§taff%29.pdf/.  A robust cap, or the adoption of any
cap, may be in doubt.  See Baptiste Aboulian, EU Bonus Cap Could Be Scrapped, FIN. TIMES,
(June 9, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d983fb2e-cf6f-11e2-be7b-00144feab7de
.html#axzz2 WD359gql.
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FIGURE 2. COMPETITION AND CAPPED PAYOFFS
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For simplicity’s sake, we assume in Figure 2 that the compensation
cap is the same for all firms.181  The compensation cap is not a static
number.  Instead, it is set in each period to reflect medium bank per-
formance—with the result that, as a dollar amount, it is higher in the
long-term than in the short-term due to the market-wide increase in com-
pensation that arises from the competition for talent (as evidenced by
the shift in pay from the original contract to the new contract).182  Unlike
Figure 1, no Employee can receive the highest employee payoff at point
B in the short-term or point G in the long-term.  Instead, all Employees
181 This simplifying assumption differs from proposals to impose a modest cap on com-
pensation based on the size of a bank’s balance sheet. See Thanassoulis, supra note 11, at R
851–52.  Varying bonus sizes can still provide employees with an incentive to incur risk if
the resulting improvement in short-term performance enhances their ability to move to a
larger bank with a higher bonus cap. See supra notes 99, 104–05 and accompanying text. R
182 Adjusting the compensation cap from the original contract to the new contract, rather
than setting it at a fixed amount during the short term and long term, is consistent with
the EU’s proposed regulation that ties bonuses to base salary. See supra note 180 and ac- R
companying text.
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are capped at point A in the short-term (under the original compensation
cap) and point F in the long-term (under the new compensation cap).
The compensation cap may result in a decline in risk taking under
some circumstances.  Certainly, a talented Employee who achieves
medium-level bank performance with moderate risk taking has little in-
centive to take more risk if her employee payoff remains unchanged.
Nevertheless, both talented and less-talented Employees may be inter-
ested in a high risk strategy if low risk is more likely to result in bank
performance and compensation below the compensation cap.183  Employ-
ees may prefer the greater likelihood of short-term gains from a high risk
approach so long as they can move to a new employer before any
losses materialize.  Like in Figure 1, by moving to a new employer, a
high risk Employee will be compensated as if she was a talented Em-
ployee, starting from an employee payoff at point E.184  By adopting a
high risk strategy at her new employer, the Employee may be able to
increase her compensation, but now due to the compensation cap, rising
from point E to point F—overall, still a significant increase in com-
pensation compared to what the high risk Employee otherwise would
have received at point C.  Reaching point F, however, does not require
the same level of bank performance as is required to reach point G.
Consequently, depending on where the compensation cap is set, maxi-
mizing compensation may be possible with fewer risky transactions or
an overall decline in risk taking.185  In addition, with a compensation
cap, new employers may anticipate that an Employee who selected high
risk in the short-term is more likely to switch jobs than a talented Em-
ployee who does not face the same long-term losses.  That separating
effect may limit Employee mobility or signal to new employers the
need to more closely monitor a new hire.186
183 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing potential distortions in the R
incentives of talented and less-talented low risk Employees arising from competition).
184 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. R
185 The long-term compensation cap could be set at a level lower than depicted in Fig-
ure 2, for example, at a fixed dollar amount corresponding to the short-term compensation
cap during both the short-term and long-term periods.  Doing so is likely to depress mobility—
causing most Employees to remain with their original employer over the long-term, since
transferring to a new employer would be less likely to increase total compensation.  The
result would be a decline in risk taking, because less mobile Employees would be more
likely to realize the negative effects of a high risk strategy.  Nevertheless, a less-talented
Employee could still adopt a short-term high risk strategy if it was necessary to reach a
medium-level of performance, hoping then to move to a new employer to avoid the result-
ing consequences.
186 To the extent that switching jobs always results in an increase in the employee payoff,
one would think that a talented Employee with medium performance also has an incentive
to move to a competitor.  However, because that Employee does not fear long-term retribu-
tion from her current employer, she is more likely to use the threat of leaving to negotiate
a long-term employee payoff under the original contract falling at point F rather than point D.
Thus, based on the likelihood of a high risk Employee moving and a low risk Employee
staying, a new employer should theoretically be able to separate low and high risk hires,
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Balanced against its benefits, the compensation cap may also limit
Employee effort and deter risky strategies that are valuable to the
bank.  By capping an Employee’s payout, the compensation cap can re-
duce a nonexecutive’s efforts since her share of any returns will be
limited.  Assume, for example, that the Employee’s contribution to
bank performance has reached the medium level (and so her pay is also
at the compensation cap), and she discovers a new opportunity to en-
hance bank performance further.  Assume also that the opportunity has
a 50 percent chance of yielding an additional $10 million for the bank
and a 50 percent chance of losing $5 million.  Notwithstanding the
risk of loss, the expected value of the opportunity is positive, $2.5 mil-
lion ((50% × $10 million) minus (50% × $5 million)).  Without the
compensation cap, pursuing the opportunity would be valuable for both
the Employee and the bank.  With the compensation cap, however, even
though the opportunity remains valuable to the bank, the Employee
has no incentive to pursue it.  Any value that results will accrue to the
bank, but any loss will reduce the Employee’s compensation.187
The question, then, is whether the potential cost of a compensation
cap outweighs its benefits.  On the one hand, Employees subject to a
cap are more likely to exert lower effort and give up valuable opportu-
nities compared to Employees in a regime without a cap.  On the
other hand, a compensation cap potentially reduces the negative effects
of mobility described in this Article.  The key to assessing its benefits is
not simply to focus on how it affects current pay but also to consider
its effect on an Employee’s future opportunities.  Even with a compen-
sation cap, excessive risk taking may be a logical strategy for some Em-
ployees if it improves bank performance, the Employee’s payout, and her
ability to switch jobs.188
taking the Employee’s high risk strategy into account when deciding whether to hire her
and the terms of her new contract.  In practice, however, an Employee can point to a num-
ber of noneconomic reasons for choosing to find a new job.  They include personal factors,
work satisfaction, satisfaction with supervision, coworkers, promotional opportunities, and
organizational commitment. See John L. Cotton & Jeffrey M. Tuttle, Employee Turnover: A
Meta-Analysis and Review with Implications for Research, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 55, 57 (1986);
W. H. Mobley et al., Review and Conceptual Analysis of the Employee Turnover Process, 86
PSYCHOL. BULL. 493, 496–512 (1979).  As a result, the signal that arises from an Employee’s
departure could be noisy.  A mandatory garden leave period would help employers identify
whether a prospective employee’s previous performance was due to excessive risk taking.
See infra Part III.B.
187 Although a drop in the compensation cap may result in a decline in risk taking, see
supra note 185, the potential effect on risk taking that is valuable to the bank is likely to be R
greater as well.
188 Risk-taking incentives may also increase depending on the effect of a compensation
cap on what Employees are paid.  For example, a cap on bonus compensation may result in
an increase in fixed salary.  Because a higher fixed salary increases the amount the Em-
ployee will earn, without regard to the results of her risky strategy, she may incur greater
risks in light of the potential increase in bonus (subject to the compensation cap), but
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A Compensation Cap is not inconsistent with this Article’s propos-
als, although it does not directly address the problems arising from
competition.  Whether a Compensation Cap is effective, we suspect, will
vary by bank and from year to year and will turn on the regulators’
ability to adjust the cap based on the experience and insights they
gain over time.189  Like our proposal, however, it will also require reg-
ulators to coordinate across the financial markets to assess the effect
of the Compensation Cap on relative incentives and mobility.
B. Limiting Mobility
At its core, the tension between compensation and competition
arises from the ability of nonexecutives to change jobs.  An employee
can incur significant risk in order to enhance short-term perform-
ance, but then switch employers to avoid the consequences of that
high-risk strategy.190
In response, new regulation should limit the ability of a bank’s
nonexecutives to move to another financial employer (including
other banks, insurance companies, broker-dealers, and hedge funds).
Regulation is required because, as noted before,191 no one firm has
the incentive to unilaterally stop competing for others’ employees and
halt competition’s distortive effect on compensation.  New regulation,
therefore, should require a bank’s nonexecutive employment con-
tracts to include terms that make continuing employment more valua-
ble than outside job opportunities.  A mandatory garden leave192
would increase the cost of an employee’s departure and, by lengthen-
ing the time before she starts her new job, permit successor employers
to better assess her prior performance.  Put another way, by requiring
a garden leave, regulation may make long-term cooperation with the
original employer more rewarding than the gains a nonexecutive
could receive by exploiting the competition for talent.193  The new
without being fully exposed to the potential loss in light of the higher fixed salary. See
Murphy, supra note 80, at 15–16.
189 See Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged Regula-
tion, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1295–99 (2012) (advocating a staged approach to imple-
menting new financial regulation that takes account of information regarding its effect on
market conduct).
190 See supra notes 96–99, 104–05 and accompanying text. R
191 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. R
192 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. R
193 This approach is grounded economically on relational contracts and repeated trust
games.  The basic intuition is that, when actors anticipate they will interact more than
once, they are more likely to consider the effect of their current actions on the future
actions of the other actors. See, e.g., DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 110
(1991) (showing that, in repeated games, players “condition their actions on the way their
opponents played in previous periods”).  This leads to cooperation so long as each actor
values continuing the interaction and they can agree upon a credible punishment in the
event either of them deviates from a cooperative strategy. See Robert Gibbons & Rebecca
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-3\CRN303.txt unknown Seq: 41 18-MAR-15 8:26
2015] PAYING FOR RISK 695
requirement would not be an absolute restriction on changing jobs,
but it would increase the cost of departure as one means to balance
against the employee’s risk-taking incentives.
Our proposal is not as novel as it first seems.  Garden leave poli-
cies already are in place at some banks,194 often to discourage employ-
ees from departing or to limit their use of company information at a
competitor.  A garden leave requirement, however, should only be as
broad as necessary to address the effects of competition on bank risk.
To this end, it should be limited to nonexecutives who are responsible
for material business lines or whose activities may expose the bank to
material amounts of risk.195  Exceptions should be made for employ-
ees who are involuntarily terminated or who leave the bank due to an
unexpected change of circumstances, including for personal reasons.
Our goal is to limit the employee’s incentives to incur risk in the short
term with the expectation of then transferring to a new employer.  Re-
laxing the garden leave requirement when the change in job is unan-
ticipated is consistent with that goal.196
The new regulation should also apply only to employees who de-
part a bank for another financial firm, because our focus is on bank
risk.  It should not extend to employees who move from one nonbank
employer to another, from a nonbank to a bank, or (presumptively)
Henderson, What Do Managers Do?, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 680,
698 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2013).
194 See Howard J. Rubin & Gregg A. Gilman, Will Garden Leaves Blossom in the States?, 33
EMP. REL. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2007).  Bank of America, for example, instituted a garden leave
requirement for financial advisors within one of its banking businesses, U.S. Trust, but not
within Merrill Lynch, although similar requirements have been introduced in other invest-
ment banks. See John Aidan Byrne, No Hardball Garden Leave at Merrill, Krawcheck Tells Advi-
sors, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Mar. 7, 2011), http://wealthmanagement.com/practice-
management/no-hardball-garden-leave-merrill-krawcheck-tells-advisors; Joe Rauch, BofA’s
U.S. Trust Adding “Garden Leave” for Some, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/02/18/us-bankofamerica-ustrust-idUSTRE71H4OZ20110218.
195 That limitation is consistent with the Compensation Guidance, except that the
Compensation Guidance extends to groups of employees subject to similar incentive com-
pensation arrangements who, in aggregate, may expose the bank to material amounts of
risk. See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,413.  This Article’s focus has been on R
individual employees and, while employee groups may raise similar issues, those issues may
be more diffuse when no individual is likely to expose the bank to material risk.  Absent
evidence to the contrary, we would limit the new regulation to individuals.
196 We have not recommended a specific garden leave period, expecting regulators to
do so after soliciting comments from financial market participants and others.  Garden
leave periods in the financial industry vary today, with examples ranging from fifty to
ninety days and potentially beyond, with receipt or retention of cash and stock bonus pay-
ments in some cases being conditioned on departing employees complying with the gar-
den leave requirements. See Rubin & Gilman, supra note 194, at 7–8.  Advisors in Bank of R
America’s U.S. Trust unit were required to stay at U.S. Trust for sixty days and avoid solicit-
ing clients for eight months after resigning. See Byrne, supra note 194. R
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from a bank to a nonfinancial firm.197  Banks will still be required to
offer market-level compensation to attract talent, offsetting any ten-
dency to pay “captive” employees unfairly.  Under this new regime,
however, employees will be less inclined to pursue high-risk strategies,
because longer-term employment will make it more likely they will
face the consequences of their risk taking.
An alternative means to limit mobility is to adopt some form of
Pigouvian tax,198 such as, for example, a tax on the compensation a
bank employee receives from her new employer.199  To date, however,
efforts to manage conduct and compensation through direct taxation
have met with limited success.  For example, in response to the take-
over wave of the 1980s, much of corporate America adopted “golden
parachutes” that awarded substantial payments to incumbent manag-
ers following a change in control of their company.  Sections 280(G)
and 4999 of the Internal Revenue Code were intended to limit golden
parachute payments by disallowing corporate deductions and impos-
ing a 20 percent tax on executives for amounts they received in excess
of three times the applicable “base amount.”200  Those amendments
prompted companies to add a “gross up” to payments that were made
in order to cover the additional tax (as well as taxes on the incremen-
tal gross-up amount).201  Imposing a new tax, therefore, caused
197 A bank employee’s ability to move to a nonfinancial firm may also be tied to her
short-term performance at the bank.  In that case, her incentives to incur risk and enhance
performance may argue in favor of imposing a garden leave requirement.
198 A Pigouvian tax is a cost-internalizing tax on an activity that reduces the negative
externalities generated by that activity. See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra
note 12, at 33. R
199 See Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, supra note 12, at 39 (“[P]olicies that discourage R
managerial mobility—say, taxing managers who switch jobs at a higher rate than loyal
ones—can improve efficiency . . . .”).
200 The “base amount” typically was the executive’s average annualized taxable com-
pensation for the prior five years or, if shorter, however long she worked for the company.
See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 280G, 98 Stat. 494, 585–87; § 4999,
98 Stat. 587.
201 See, e.g., Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensa-
tion Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 512–19 & n.117 (2009) (noting
that many companies reimburse executives for the extra taxes they incur).  Similar
problems arose with Internal Revenue Code section 162(m), which provided that annual
compensation in excess of $1 million paid to the CEO and the four other highest-paid
officers of a public company could not be deducted by the company as an ordinary busi-
ness expense. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec.
13211, § 162, 107 Stat. 312, 469–71.  The new provision had limited effect on total com-
pensation—many firms continued to pay compensation in excess of $1 million—and, in
fact, increased the use of performance-based pay (such as stock options) which was exempt
from section 162(m)’s limit on deductibility. See Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing
and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 383,
396–414 (2008); see also David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Founda-
tion of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 468 (2000) (noting section 162(m)
may have been a means to encourage performance compensation rather than a way to
limit total compensation); Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay:
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changes in how compensation was structured but did little to reduce
the amount that was paid.  Like with a tax, some portion of a garden
leave’s cost can be offset by what the new employer pays, but we be-
lieve there is also a real cost—to the employee and, significantly, to
the new employer—associated with her being “out of the business” for
a substantial period of time.  The employee may lose customer and
other relationships, become less current on market practices, or fall
behind business changes that occur while she is away.  Those costs
may be difficult to assess, potentially limiting her appeal to a prospec-
tive employer and making any reimbursement less certain.
C. Long-Term Equity Compensation and Cash-Outs
New regulation should require a portion of a nonexecutive’s pay
to consist of long-term participation in the bank’s equity.  Tying a por-
tion of pay to bank performance, and forfeiting future rewards if the
employee moves to another financial firm, will provide the nonexecu-
tive with an incentive to remain with her employer.202  Similar to a
mandatory garden leave, this will reduce the incentives for excessive
risk taking by making it more likely a nonexecutive will face the long-
term consequences of her risk choices.  From a theoretical perspec-
tive, using compensation tied to long-term economic performance as
a means to incentivize hard-to-monitor employees has been well
Using the Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working
Paper No. 7842, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7842 (suggesting firms
near cap may have restrained salary increases).
202 Of course, the composition of a long-term equity compensation package must also
be considered.  As this Article’s empirical results show, by tying returns to long-term finan-
cial performance, equity compensation may be able to offset incentives for excessive risk
taking. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  At the same time, because a stock R
option holder receives the full benefit of an increase in stock price, but does not bear the
full cost of a loss, see Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9, at 263, an excessive reliance on R
equity-based compensation may provide bank managers with an incentive to prefer riskier
projects at the expense of creditors, including depositors, see id. at 253, 283–84 (arguing
that bank executive compensation should be tied to a security basket representing “a set
percentage of the aggregate value of common shares, preferred shares, and all outstanding
bonds”); see also Richard A. DeFusco et al., The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stock-
holders and Bondholders, 45 J. FIN. 617, 618 (1990) (“The asymmetric payoffs of call options
make it more attractive for managers to undertake risky projects.”).  Moreover, equity com-
pensation is unlikely to be effective in managing risk if existing employers are forced by
market competition to guarantee a minimum bonus. See Smith, supra note 86 (“At most R
firms, much or most of the bonus is paid in stock, which vests over several years, to reward
long-term performance.  But the market for talent is competitive and many firms have
been compelled to offer guaranteed or minimum bonuses to recruit people . . . .”).
Restricted compensation also permits an employee—in part, based on her assessment of
future compensation—to calculate the cost of departing the bank against the cost of re-
maining.  In a competitive market, an employee is likely to discount the value of long-term
compensation at her current employer if she adopted a high-risk strategy to enhance her
short-term performance.  See supra notes 87–88, 102 and accompanying text.  The chal- R
lenge, therefore, is to design a pay package that balances the risk-reducing and risk-
enhancing effects of equity compensation.
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explored in the industrial organizational literature.203  As applied to
banks, employee ownership, if structured for the long term, could
likewise help incentivize optimal risk taking.  This argument finds sup-
port in the empirical evidence, described earlier in Part II.B, that
showed that stock incentives paid to bank nonexecutives in 2003–2006
were correlated with lower bank risk and higher bank value during
2007–2009.204
One potential concern is that a bank employee may still choose
to increase short-term risk taking if the pay package she receives from
a new employer offsets the long-term compensation she forgoes,
either by paying cash for the restricted compensation “left behind” or
substituting the new employer’s own long-term pay package (referred
to as a “golden handshake”).205  In that case, the nonexecutive will
still have an incentive to incur risk if, by doing so, she increases the
likelihood of a higher-paying (and offsetting) job offer from someone
else.206
Some portion of our concern is addressed by our prior proposal
to limit bank employee mobility.207  By imposing a garden leave, a
nonexecutive is more likely to remain with the same bank over the
long term, with the consequences of excessive risk taking weighing
against incentives to pursue a short-term, high-risk strategy.  Our addi-
tion here is to propose that new employers be restricted from “cashing
out” the long-term portion of a new hire’s prior compensation when
setting a new pay package.  The Compensation Guidance directs
203 See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 786–90 (suggesting that employee ownership
may incentivize forms of peer monitoring); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and
Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 471 (1979) (noting that production maximization is par-
tially a function of the “organizational forms” available, which are based upon property
and contract law); Raymond Russell, Employee Ownership and Internal Governance, 6 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 217, 228 (1985) (noting that conventional modes of organization are inap-
propriate where “performance is hard to meter, and [where] differences in labor quality
are hard to identify and control”).
204 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.  These results are consistent with other R
recent empirical studies of the use of employee stock option plans (ESOPs).  In particular,
one of the studies documents that nonfinancial firms employing ESOPs to remunerate
nonexecutives exhibit lower enterprise risk relative to firms that do not use this form of
compensation. See Francesco Bova et al., Non-Executive Employee Ownership and Corporate Risk
12–14 (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2297996, 2014), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2297996.  The impact of ESOPs on em-
ployee mobility has also been empirically investigated, with several studies finding that
broad-based equity ownership helps retain a firm’s employees. See, e.g., John E. Core &
Wayne R. Guay, Stock Option Plans for Non-Executive Employees, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 253, 257, 274
(2001); Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to all Employees?: An
Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 110 (2005).
205 See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,401, 36,410. R
206 See supra notes 99, 105 and accompanying text. R
207 See supra Part III.B.
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banks to assess whether golden handshakes materially weaken efforts
to constrain risk taking.208  Because nonbank employers may offer
them, it notes that bank supervisors should continue efforts to coordi-
nate with other financial regulators.209  We believe that new regula-
tion must go further and apply equally to nonbank financial firms.
Restricting a new employer—whether a bank or a nonbank—from off-
setting the costs of a risky strategy will reinforce the benefits of com-
pensation that is tied to long-term performance.210
CONCLUSION
Efforts to control bank risk taking by regulating executive pay rest
on two faulty premises—first, that executive pay was the principal
driver of bank risk prior to the 2007 financial crisis, and second, that a
bank’s managers can bring nonexecutives into line by using incentives
to manage risk taking once executive pay is regulated.  What they miss
is the effect on compensation of the competition among banks and
nonbanks to hire nonexecutives—with changes in pay in response to
the demand for talent creating incentives for bank nonexecutives to
incur greater risk.211
In effect, the greater competition for products and services,
which benefited consumers by enhancing financial market effi-
ciency,212 also increased the cost of maintaining financial market sta-
bility.  Has the trade-off been positive?  The answer is unlikely to come
from the financial firms themselves.  The greater competition created
a negative externality: each bank’s efforts to hire talent rewarded
riskier strategies without accounting for the longer-term losses that
could result.213  In this Article, we proposed three ways in which regu-
lation could step in—greater coordination across bank and nonbank
208 See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,410. R
209 As the Compensation Guidance states:
Provisions that require a departing employee to forfeit deferred incentive
compensation payments may . . . weaken the effectiveness of a deferral ar-
rangement if the departing employee is able to negotiate a “golden hand-
shake” arrangement with the employee’s new organization.  Golden
handshake provisions present special issues for banking organizations and
supervisors . . . because it is the action of the employee’s new employer—
which may not be a regulated institution—that can affect the current em-
ployer’s ability to properly align the employee’s interest with the organiza-
tion’s long-term health. . . .  The Agencies will continue to work with
banking organizations and others to develop appropriate methods for ad-
dressing any effect that such arrangements may have . . . .
Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,401 (citation omitted). R
210 As noted earlier, one means to coordinate efforts among bank and nonbank finan-
cial regulators is to use the FSOC’s authority to identify financial market risks and recom-
mend new regulation. See supra note 178. R
211 See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. R
212 See Whitehead, supra note 157, at 37–39. R
213 See supra notes 87–88, 100 and accompanying text. R
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regulators,214 a mandatory garden leave,215 and requiring banks to in-
clude a long-term equity component in nonexecutive pay, with subse-
quent employers being restricted from compensating for any losses an
employee incurs related to her prior work.216  Those new require-
ments could be introduced together with, or in lieu of, a compensa-
tion cap.217
One regulatory solution we have not explored is forcing financial
firms back into the traditional business categories in which they oper-
ated.218  Doing so would limit the competition for products and ser-
vices and, in turn, lower the competition for nonexecutives.  We are
wary, however, of such an approach, because it moves against the
trend toward convergence in the financial markets we have seen over
the last five decades.219  New regulation should reflect the benefits of
that convergence, but it must also take account of the new costs.
214 See supra Part III.A.
215 See supra Part III.B.
216 See supra Part III.C.
217 We analyze how a compensation cap could work at supra notes 181–89 and accom- R
panying text.
218 See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. R
219 See supra notes 62–78 and accompanying text. R
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APPENDIX: COMPENSATION GUIDANCE AND JOINTLY PROPOSED
INCENTIVE RULES
The Compensation Guidance is a principles-based approach to
incentives, without mandating or prohibiting any specific forms of
compensation or establishing mandatory levels or caps.220  It is di-
rected toward senior executives at banks, individuals (including non-
executives) whose activities may expose a bank to material amounts of
risk, and groups of employees who are subject to the same or similar
incentive compensation and who, in aggregate, may expose the bank
to material amounts of risk (even if no one person is likely to do
so).221  The Compensation Guidance is premised on three core prin-
ciples, namely that (i) incentives should appropriately balance risk
and financial results in order not to encourage employees to take im-
prudent risks; (ii) incentives should be compatible with effective con-
trols and risk management; and (iii) incentives should be supported
by strong corporate governance, including board oversight.222  Bank
regulators have committed to ensure that banks incorporate the Com-
pensation Guidance through a process that includes inspections and
examinations that will produce a supervisory rating that reflects bank
compliance.223  That rating will form a part of the Uniform Financial
Institutions Rating System regime, adopted by the Fed, the OCC, and
the FDIC, which provides a composite score based on a bank’s capital
adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitiv-
ity to market risk (known by its acronym, “CAMELS”).224  CAMELS is
often criticized for failing to identify troubled banks,225 and so its
effectiveness in policing bank activities is open to question.226
Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act227 requires the Fed, the OCC,
the FDIC, the OTS, the NCUA, the SEC, and the FHFA (together, the
Agencies) to introduce the Jointly Proposed Incentive Rules regarding
incentive pay for a much broader range of financial institutions.  The
proposed rules contain standards that are consistent with the Com-
220 See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,399. R
221 Id. at 36,407.
222 Id. at 36,398; see also FSF PRINCIPLES, supra note 19, at 2–3; FIN. STABILITY BD., FSB R
PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES: IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS 2–5 (2009),
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf (setting
out high-level guidance on implementing principles).
223 See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,406. R
224 See id.; DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REGULATION, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL § A.5020.1, at 1–2 (1997), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cbem/cbem.pdf.
225 See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1314 (2013).
226 See Simone M. Sepe, Regulating Risk and Governance in Banks: A Contractarian Perspec-
tive, 62 EMORY L.J. 327, 393–94 (2012).
227 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 956, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5641 (2012).
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pensation Guidance.  Specifically, the Agencies would prohibit
incentive-based pay to executive officers, employees, directors, or
principal shareholders that is excessive and encourages inappropriate
risks or that could lead to material financial loss.228  The new rules
also would prohibit pay that is unreasonable or disproportionate to
the amount, nature, quality, and scope of services performed.229  In
addition, for larger firms, a portion of incentive pay would be de-
ferred for executives, and the board would be required to identify and
approve incentive pay for nonexecutives who have the ability to ex-
pose the firm to substantial losses.230
228 See id.
229 See Jointly Proposed Incentive Rules, supra note 177, at 21,170. R
230 See id. at 21,173.
